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I. INTRODUCTION
Adzan Bedonie is a Navajo woman who speaks no English,
holds tightly to traditional Navajo beliefs, and lives in a one-room
hogan on the wrong side of the line drawn by a federal court to parti-
tion Navajo and Hopi lands.' The law that mandates her relocation
and thus threatens to sever what for her is a spiritual connection to
the land on which she lives2 offers a potential escape route: Congress
provided for a limited number of life estates for older individuals
subject to relocation.3 But Adzan Bedonie, like most elderly Navajo,
has not applied for a life estate, because traditional Navajo beliefs
preclude any discussion of one's death or of preparation for it.
4
Hodari D., a young black man who lives in Oakland, California,
was standing with three or four of his friends one spring evening when
they were approached by two police officers; all of the young men ran
away. Hodari was pursued on foot by one of the officers, was seen to
* Associate Professor of Law, Washington University, St. Louis. I would like to thank
Susan Appleton, Dan Keating, Ron Levin, and Richard Lazarus for helpful comments on earlier
drafts of this Article, and to extend very special thanks to Kathy Goldwasser for aid above and
beyond. Any errors that remain are entirely my own. I acknowledge as well the able research
assistance of Judy Marrs, and, as always, I'm grateful for the support of my life partner, Dayna
Deck.
1. Hattie Clark, Lands Lost, Christian Sci. Monitor 16 (Oct. 22, 1987). The history of the
Navajo-Hopi land partition is complex. The major points of reference are as follows: An 1882
Executive Order created a reservation for the Hopi "and such other Indians as the Secretary of
the Interior may see fit to settle thereon." Executive Order of President Chester Arthur (Dec. 16,
1882), reprinted in Healing v. Jones, 210 F. Supp. 125, 129 n.1 (D. Ariz. 1962). Over time,
increasing numbers of Navajo came to reside within the boundaries of the 1882 reservation. In
1962, a three-judge district court, acting under authority of Pub. L. No. 85-547, 72 Stat. 403
(1958), set aside one-sixth of the reservation for exclusive Hopi use but gave the Navajo and Hopi
Tribes "joint, undivided, and equal interests" in the remainder, which came to be called the Joint
Use Area (JUA). Healing, 210 F. Supp. at 192. The Navajo-Hopi Relocation Act of 1974 conferred
jurisdiction on the U.S. District Court for Arizona to partition the Joint Use Area and mandated a
50-50 division of the lands. Pub. L. No. 93-531, 88 Stat. 17124, codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 640d-640d-28 (1988 & Supp. 1992). The Act required relocation but established various
relocation benefits for Navajo and Hopi residents who lived on the 'wrong side" of the partition
lines. 25 U.S.C. §§ 640d-13-14 (1988). Adzan Bedonie is among the more than 10,000 Navajo
subject to relocation as a consequence of the partition order; she is one of an estimated 250-450
individuals who have not applied for relocation assistance. For a more detailed account of the
history of the Navajo-Hopi dispute, see Hollis A. Whitson, A Policy Review of the Federal
Government's Relocation of Navajo Indians Under P.L. 93-531 and P.L. 96.305, 27 Ariz. L. Rev.
371 (1985). See also generally Jerry Kammer, The Second Long Walk (U. of N. M., 1981).
2. Clark, Christian Sci. Monitor at 16 (cited in note 1). See also Whitson, 27 Ariz. L. Rev.
at 387 (cited in note 1) (explaining that "[tlo the people of the JUA, the land is their spiritual
connection with future generations").
3. A 1980 amendment to the 1974 Relocation Act made available life estate leases for
residents who were disabled or at least 49 years of age. 25 U.S.C. § 640d-28 (1988).
4. Clark, Christian Sci. Monitor at 16 (cited in note 1); Whitson, 27 Ariz. L. Rev. at 379
(cited in note 1).
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discard a small rock that proved to be crack cocaine, and was captured
a moment later. The Supreme Court ruled against Hodari's attempt
to suppress the cocaine as evidence, on the ground that Hodari had
not been "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when
he saw the officer running toward him.5 Writing for the Court, Justice
Scalia suggested as well that the State's concession that it lacked the
reasonable suspicion necessary to justify stopping Hodari was overly
hasty: "That it would be unreasonable to stop, for brief inquiry, young
men who scatter in panic upon the mere sighting of the police ...
arguably contradicts proverbial common sense. See Proverbs 28:1
('The wicked flee when no man pursueth)." 6
Justice Stevens provided another perspective on Hodari's
behavior:
The Court's gratuitous quotation from Proverbs 28:1 . . . mistakenly assumes
that innocent residents have no reason to fear the sudden approach of strang-
ers. We have previously considered, and rejected, this ivory-towered analysis
of the real world for it fails to describe the experience of many residents, par-
ticularly if they are members of a minority.
7
As little as Adzan Bedonie and Hodari D. otherwise may have
in common, they share the "spirit-murdering"s experience of being
required to answer to authorities whose assessments of reality they do
not share, a cultural imposition not likely borne by persons more
closely aligned with mainstream values.9 Individual autonomy has at
best an attenuated meaning in these circumstances.10 Equality norms
5. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
6. Id. at 623 n.1.
7. Id. at 630 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
8. The term is Pat Williams's. See Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger.
The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. Miami L. Rev. 127 (1987).
9. The two selected examples present quite different forms of cultural variation from the
mainstream. Although some features of present-day Navajo life may be conditioned by contact
with, and repression by, non-Indian culture, the traditional beliefs at issue in Adzan Bedonie's
case are part of a fully developed indigenous culture that has existed for centuries independently
of Euro-American society. In contrast, the aspect of Hodari's world implicated by his instinctual
flight from authority likely is constructed in large part by the larger society that surrounds him.
Though some facets of his experience undoubtedly reflect surviving elements of African culture, a
very significant proportion of what it means to be a black male in this society is determined by
whites. See Frederick Hord, African Americans, Cultural Pluralism and the Politics of Culture,
91 W. Va. L. Rev. 1047 (1989); Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters" Some Preliminary
Thoughts About Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 Valp. U. L. Rev. 243, 250-
62 (1991).
10. The proposition that individual autonomy may require cultural self-definition is
discussed in Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See". White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 953, 1010-13 (1993); Kenneth L. Karst,
Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 303, 306-11 (1986);
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are negatively impacted as well, because Adzan and Hodari are denied
avenues of self-definition arguably open to persons situated nearer the
culture's normative center.,, Their experiences impel consideration of
the ways law might foster and preserve cultural pluralism.2
This Article examines one as-yet-unexplored strategy for
pursuing pluralist values-the use of subjective experience as an
element of legal doctrine, and of constitutional doctrine in particular.
One example of the sort of rule at issue here would be the following:
governmental interference with family interests, as defined by the
subjective experience of the constitutional challenger, must be justified
as necessary to serve compelling government interests. 13 A rule of this
nature offers, on its face, the potential to foster cultural pluralism by
providing the same level of constitutional protection to every
individual's experienced interests-here, family interests. However,
closer examination reveals that this doctrinal technique carries with it
as much peril as promise.
Part II of this Article includes a sketch of the case for cultural
pluralism and a brief comparison of doctrinal appeals to subjective
experience with other available means of implementing pluralist
Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the
Last Reconstruction, 100 Yale L. J. 1329, 1389-92 (1991).
11. This argument is developed more fully in the text accompanying notes 14-16.
12. For the purposes of this Article, "pluralism" does not refer to interest group pluralism,
but rather to the value of permitting, and perhaps encouraging, racial and ethnic groups to retain
significant portions of their group culture and identity. "Assimilationism" disfavors the retention
of distinct racial or ethnic identities. See Kevin M. Fong, Comment, Cultural Pluralism, 13 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 133, 136-37 (1978); Gerald Torres, Critical Race Theory: The Decline of the
Universalist Ideal and the Hope of Plural Justice-Some Observations and Questions of an
Emerging Phenomenon, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 993 (1991); Patricia J. Williams, Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. v. FCC: Regrouping in Singular Times, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 525, 528-33 (1990). See also Iris
Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference 156-91 (Princeton U., 1990); John 0.
Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an Authentic Intellectual
Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2129, 2130-32 (1992); Burt Neuborne, Ghosts in
the Attic: Idealized Pluralism, Community and Hate Speech, 27 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 371
(1992); Gerald Torres, Local Knowledge, Local Color:. Critical Legal Studies and the Law of Race
Relations, 25 San Diego L. Rev. 1043, 1062-70 (1988); Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of
Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian
Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L. Rev. 219, 291-99.
I use interchangeably the terms "multiculturalism," "pluralism," "cultural pluralism," and
"cultural diversity." I do not mean to assert that cultural pluralism is always the preferred goal of
law, but only that it is worthy of exploration. See notes 17-20 and accompanying text. I do
assume, for the sake of discussion, that cultural pluralism can be pursued in an integrated society;
I take no position on the virtues of cultural separatism. For a thoughtful comment on the
question of separatism, see Gary Peller, Notes Toward a Postmodern Nationalism, 1992 U. M. L.
Rev. 1095.
13. This rule in fact may have been proposed by Justice Brennan, in Bowen v. Gilliard, 483
U.S. 587 (1987). See notes 161-70 and accompanying text.
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values in law. The remainder of the Article describes, evaluates, and
draws some conclusions from representative constitutional cases in
which the Supreme Court has closely approximated the paradigmatic
use of subjective experience as a doctrinal variable. Part III
canvasses three categories of cases: the Fourth Amendment cases
that develop the "subjective expectation of privacy" doctrine, the
Establishment Clause cases in which Justice O'Connor sets forth her
"messages of endorsement" test, and a group of three unrelated cases
in which individual Justices appeal to subjective experience in dissent.
Part IV then collects and elaborates on the observations developed in
Part III.
I conclude in Part IV.A that the Court's record in employing
subjective experience as a doctrinal variable is little short of
dismal-its appeals to subjective experience generally have anti-
pluralist consequences. However, I also argue in Part IV.B that the
Court's failure to make constructive use of subjective experience as a
constitutional variable may be attributed in large part to an
institutional consideration: the impulse to avoid explicit normative
constitutional discourse whenever possible. In Part IV.C I conclude
that focusing more directly on the pluralist implications of the
doctrinal strategy in question may rehabilitate it as a means of
implementing pluralist values.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF STRATEGIES FOR IMPLEMENTING CULTURAL
PLURALISM
The case for cultural pluralism as social policy has two strands.
First, some attention to pluralism may be necessary in order to vindi-
cate other core societal values such as individual autonomy and equal-
ity. In addition, in some respects cultural diversity has been a part of
the Euro-American tradition from the beginning. These two strands
are intertwined.
I was brought up with the "melting pot" approach to problems
of multiculturalism: assimilation was seen as the obviously desirable,
and seemingly sole, means of achieving unity in what was often de-
scribed as a nation of immigrants. However, the images associated
with the melting pot story were comfortable ones that generally fea-
tured Caucasian immigrants from Europe whose "differences" rarely
amounted to more than the facts that they didn't speak English, they
often adhered to beliefs and practices that could easily be seen as
implicating only "private" concerns, such as religious beliefs and
1994] 277
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differing approaches to family life, and sometimes they had a slightly
darker skin color than we were used to seeing.14 For many European
immigrants, assimilationism apparently imposed no intolerable
costs.15
Partly due to the Eurocentric focus of the "melting pot" story,
we didn't think about, nor were we forced to confront, the ways
assimilationism impacts other societal norms such as autonomy and
equality. These three values collide most vividly in cases like those of
Adzan and Hodari, because they strongly suggest that the power of
cultural self-definition may be crucial to individual autonomy, and, as
a corollary, that equality norms cannot be realized when some are
afforded opportunities for self-determination that others are not.16 In
each of these instances, the power of a legal regime whose basic
presuppositions are not wholly shared as a cultural matter constrains
the individual's power to pursue life on his or her own terms; persons
nearer the cultural mainstream likely do not experience the loss of
personhood implicit in the stories of Adzan and Hodari. The
autonomy and equality costs of legal assimilationism-a regime of
culturally uniform legal rules that hold some individuals to standards
that express and embody a universe of meaning wholly foreign to their
own experience of life-may go unrecognized under the "melting pot"
story of American culture.
Of course, the cultural homogeneity that is the goal of assimi-
lationism is not the sole American ideal. In addition to equality and
autonomy, we also recognize the value of cultural diversity per se, 17 at
least in some circumstances, most notably with respect to the
protection of freedom of speech and religion.8 But speech and religion
14. See, for example, Israel Zangwill, The Melting Pot 33 (Macmillan, 1914) (claiming that
"America is God's Crucible, the great Melting-Pot where all the races of Europe are melting and
re-forming").
15. This observation is not meant to suggest that assimilation imposed no burdens on
European immigrants.
16. It should be obvious that cultural differentiation serves autonomy and equality values
only when the cultural identity at issue is optional rather than mandatory. It is cultural self-
definition that is under consideration here, not externally imposed categorization.
17. See generally John Dewey, The Principle of Nationality, in Jo Ann Boydston, ed., 10
The Middle Works, 1899-1924 (S. 111. U., 1976); Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan,
Beyond the Melting Pot (M.I.T., 2d ed. 1970); Andrew M. Greeley, Why Can't They Be Like Us?
(Institute of Human Relations, 1969); Michael Novak, The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics
(Macmillan, 1972); Peter Schrag, The Decline of the WASP (Simon and Schuster, 1971); Karst, 64
N.C. L. Rev. at 325-36 (cited in note 10).
18. Consider, for example, Justice Douglas's acknowledgment of the value of cultural
diversity: "The melting pot is not designed to homogenize people, making them uniform in
consistency. The melting pot as I understand it is a figure of speech that depicts the wide
278 [Vol. 47:273
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do not begin to encompass the variety of ways cultures vary.19 Stories
like those of Adzan Bedonie and Hodari D. illuminate the importance
of, and provide the strongest argument for, expanding our pluralist
horizons beyond the traditional First Amendment arena.
However, this Article does not require the reader's assent to
the proposition that multiculturalism is the preferred mode of social
life in every instance. Rather, the choice between assimilationism and
cultural pluralism presents a dilemma at every level of social policy:
on the one hand, constituting ourselves as a single society requires the
articulation and implementation of at least some shared norms; on the
other hand, living within a normative framework that one does not
share may strip life of its most fundamental source of meaning-the
ability to decide for oneself what that meaning will be. Legal rules
pose this dilemma most sharply, because of the coercive power of law:
the full weight of law's violence20 is arrayed against the personal
autonomy of the individual who, like Adzan or Hodari, does not share
in the normative underpinnings of society's legal rules.
One key ingredient in the resolution of the pluralist dilemma,
the question whether a pluralist legal regime is desirable, is inevitably
affected by the question whether such a regime is possible. Thus, one
important element in what should be an ongoing dialogue about the
extent to which we are, or want to be, a culturally pluralist society
must be the examination of available strategies for implementing
pluralism at the level of legal rules.21 Most frequently, cultural
pluralism is pursued via discretionary or categorical techniques.22
diversities tolerated by the First Amendment under one flag." DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312,
334 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
19. In addition, singling out those aspects of culture for special protection may itself be an
expression of Eurocentrism. Other values, such as closeness to the land, or communal styles of
living, may be equally or even more important in other cultures.
20. Robert Cover most persuasively characterized law's coercive power as violence. Robert
M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale L. J. 1601 (1986).
21. Legal mechanisms that foster cultural diversity may themselves exhibit an individualist
or a group.regarding focus. In this Article "pluralism" is a generic term that denotes the goal of
diversity rather than any specific means of achieving it. In contrast, for example, Robert Post as-
sociates 'pluralism" with group-based approaches and characterizes as "individualist" a legal
regime that pursues diversity values by focusing on the individual. See Robert C. Post, Cultural
Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy, and the First Amendment, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 297
(1988).
Both the individualist and the group-rights strategies present the potential for conflict
between the individual's and the group's interests along the dimension of cultural diversity. See,
for example, Martha Minow, Pluralisms, 21 Conn. L. Rev. 965, 968-70 (1989) (discussing group
and individual interests at stake in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)); Post, 76 Cal. L. Rev.
at 303-04; Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (pitting tribal interest in self-
determination against a woman's interest in freedom from sex discrimination).
22. An additional option that this Article does not explore would be accession by the
majority to complete self-determination and'self-governance by a subordinate group. See Minow,
1994] 279
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First, policymakers may attempt to be more sensitive to the
cultural perspectives of those affected by their decisions. For example,
congressional drafters might have informed themselves more fully on
the ways traditional Navajo would view their participation in the
process of claiming an exemption from the policy of relocation. Per-
haps another, more culturally appropriate method of providing the
equivalent of life estates could have been identified. In general, the
broad discretion inherent in the act of policymaking renders this area
of the law a fertile ground for the accommodation of cultural differ-
ences.2
3
Second, officials charged with the implementation and en-
forcement of laws often are granted considerable discretion, which
they can and sometimes do exercise with an eye toward cultural di-
versity.24 In the case of the Navajo-Hopi relocation program, for ex-
ample, the Office of Navajo and Hopi Relocation never has pursued
involuntary relocation of individuals who stated they would not move
as directed by the Navajo-Hopi Relocation Act.25 Though discretionary
enforcement generally has more critics than proponents, it remains an
available technique for preserving cultural autonomy.26
21 Conn. L. Rev. at 970-71 (cited in note 21). I assume, for the sake of debate in this Article, that
the (culturally defined) majority wishes to, and will, retain ultimate control over cultural sub-
groups. Thus the realm of legal options under consideration is limited by the presumed existence
of a social hierarchy so defined.
23. See Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 10, 70-95 (1987).
24. However, much of the standard literature has been overtly or implicitly critical of
discretion in enforcement. See generally Kenneth C. Davis, Discretionary Justice; A Preliminary
Inquiry (L.S.U., 1969); Kenneth C. Davis, Police Discretion (West, 1975); Mortimer R. Kadish and
Sanford H. Kadish, Discretion to Disobey (Stanford U., 1973); Denis J. Galligan, Discretionary
Powers: A Legal Study of Official Discretion (Oxford U., 1986); George C. Christie, An Essay on
Discretion, 1986 Duke L. J. 747; Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 14
(1967), reprinted in Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 14 (Harvard U., 1977); Symposium,
Discretion in Law Enforcement, L. & Contemp. Probs. 1 (Autumn 1984).
25. Navajo-Hopi Relocation Housing Program Reauthorization Act of 1991, Hearings on S.
1720 before the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1991)
(statement of Carl J. Kunasek, Commissioner, Office of Navajo and Hopi Indian Relocation).
However, the ONHIR intends to increase its pressure on residents of partitioned lands to move
"voluntarily." Id. at 19-20.
26. Criticism of discretion as inimical to cultural pluralist values can be found in American
Friends Service Committee, Struggle for Justice: A Report on Crime and Punishment in America
(Hill & Wang, 1971); Richard Delgado, et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 1359; Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of
Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 Harv.
Women's L. J. 57 (1984). Proponents of discretion as a vehicle for promoting cultural diversity
include Joel F. Handler, The Conditions of Discretion: Autonomy, Community, Bureaucracy
(Russell Sage Foundation, 1986); Harold E. Pepinsky, Better Living Through Police Discretion, L.
& Contemp. Probs. 249 (Autumn 1984).
280
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Each of these first two options may be enhanced by giving
focused consideration to subjective experience; it can illuminate oth-
erwise hidden social and cultural factors that affect normative judg-
ment in these areas of legal discretion. The first step in understand-
ing these covert influences is to identify the experiential boundaries of
one's own normative orientation.27 Second, one should seek out infor-
mation concerning experiences, and the generalizations built upon
them, that are different from one's own. Attending to others' stories is
one important and increasingly recognized means of expanding one's
experiential base and thus of promoting the adoption of pluralist
policies and influencing the exercise of discretion in law in ways that
accommodate cultural diversity. By illuminating others' visions of
reality and of life's purposes and ideals, storytelling can dislodge
existing mindsets and expose members of the dominant culture to the
richness of experience diversity has to offer.28 The decisionmaker who
27. Note that the relationship between subjective experience and the normative is not
unidirectional. Norms impact subjective experience as much as experience influences norms.
Consider, for example, the phenomenon of consciousness-raising. The term refers to a sequence
of events in which the way one describes one's own experience changes over time as a conse-
quence of evolution in the normative lens through which the experiences in question are viewed.
This change in normative framework can affect experience so deeply that the individual may feel
compelled to disavow the accuracy of any earlier characterization of "what happened." In a sense,
the experience as later understood and described is not the same experience as the earlier one.
See Barbara Flagg, Women's Narratives, Women's Story, 59 U. Cin. L. Rev. 147, 149-51 (1990)
(book review).
28. Storytelling is an expansive term that has been described as encompassing:
at least three different subjects: the place in legal education and doctrine of the personal
stories of actual people; the stories that legal doctrines tell about the world, its problems
and its potential; and the way in which stories are or can be used strategically as a
method to enhance the quality of communication between actors in legal settings such as
law offices and courtrooms.
Jane B. Baron, The Many Promises of Storytelling in Law, 23 Rutgers L. J. 79, 80-81 (1991) (book
review). I emphasize here the recounting of individuals' actual, lived experience and its impact on
legal doctrine. The voluminous and rapidly expanding literature on legal storytelling also
includes Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 971 (1991); Clark D.
Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2459
(1989); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87
Mich. L. Rev. 2411 (1989); Richard Delgado, When a Story Is Just a Story: Does Voice Really
Matter?, 76 Va. L. Rev. 95 (1990); Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together?
Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. Mi-
ami L. Rev. 511 (1992); Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Word and the River. Pedagogy as Scholar-
ship as Struggle, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2231 (1992); Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling,
and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2099 (1989); Mar J. Matsuda,
Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 323
(1987); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87
Mich. L. Rev. 2320 (1989); Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2073
(1989); Gerald Torres and Kathryn Milun, Translating Yonnondio by Precedent and Evidence:
The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 Duke L. J. 625; Robin West, Love, Rage and Legal Theory, 1 Yale
J. L. & Feminism 101 (1989). Perhaps the paradigm of storytelling in legal analysis is Patricia J.
Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights (Harvard U., 1991).
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takes a variety of experiential perspectives into account has thereby
improved her prospects of reaching more informed, fully considered,
and therefore more satisfactory normative judgments than would
have been the case had she relied on her own experience
alone.29 Expanding the range of experiential perspectives upon
which decisions are based can help reduce the impact of unexamined
and perhaps unwanted cultural and social influences on discretionary
policymaking and policy implementation . °  Storytelling also can
illuminate the harms of existing practices and laws as they are
experienced by members of subordinate cultures; so employed,
outsiders' stories can engage the conscience of those in power in the
direction of more inclusive policymaking and practice. 31  The non-
29. For example, even though race is a highly salient element of nearly all social interac-
tions, white people tend not to identify as a racial characteristic the whiteness of other whites. As
a result, we often associate the notion of race, and racial issues, with people of color. When we
attempt to think through racial issues, then, we are much too likely to consider our racially
contingent perspective neutral, and to identify the perspectives of people of color as "biased" or
"self-interested." See Flagg, 91 Mich. L. Rev. at 969-79 (cited in note 10). Following the general
lines set out in the text, we should acquire the habit of identifying ourselves and our judgments as
distinctively white, and at the same time should seek to learn about and try to understand the
perspectives of nonwhites. The broader base this approach provides can help prevent the
unwitting imposition of white norms in circumstances in which race-specific criteria are
disfavored, or can contribute to the formation of a sounder basis for their adoption when that is
the appropriate course of action.
30. In James Boyd White's words:
Reading texts composed by other minds in other worlds can help us see more clearly
(what is otherwise nearly invisible) the force and meaning of the habits of mind and lan-
guage in which we have been brought up, as lawyers and as people, and to which we shall
in all likelihood remain unconscious unless led to perceive or imagine other worlds. We
can thus learn to read humanistic texts with an eye to understanding: the language and
culture in which they are composed; the art by which actors in the worlds defined by these
languages (and the authors of texts written in them) struggle to come to terms with them;
and the kind of ethical and political relations that speakers within the world of the text,
and the author of the text in his writing of it, create with their respective interlocutors.
In all three respects we can hope to find in them a ground for the criticism of our own
world, of our own texts, and of our own relations with others.
James Boyd White, What Can a Lawyer Learn from Literature?, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 2014, 2023
(1989) (book review).
The law and literature movement, of which James Boyd White's work is an example, places
somewhat different emphasis on the relation between legal analysis and storytelling than do the
works cited in note 28. See Baron, 23 Rutgers L. J. at 81 n.15 (cited in note 28) (explaining that
"the precise relationship between the storytelling and law and literature 'movements' remains
unclear"). For examples of the law and literature approach, see James Boyd White, Heracles' Bow
(U. of Wis., 1985); Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1983);
Richard K. Sherwin, A Matter of Voice and Plot. Belief and Suspicion in Legal Storytelling, 87
Mich. L. Rev. 543 (1988); Symposium, Law and Literature, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 373 (1982); Symposium,
Law and Literature, 39 Mercer L. Rev. 739 (1988). A compilation of sources in both the
storytelling and law and literature traditions can be found in James R. Elkins, A Bibliography of
Narrative, 40 J. Legal Educ. 203 (1990).
31. Some of the literature concerning the regulation of racist speech provides the most
striking examples of the use of stories to illuminate experienced harms and so to prod the
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coercive character of narrative makes it especially well suited to the
task of influencing discretionary decisionmaking.
However, the relative lack of constraint inherent in discretion-
ary judgment and storytelling, and in other perspective-broadening
devices as well, marks the weakness of each as techniques for affect-
ing social policy. Anti-assimilationist policies can be effectuated
through the discretion of members of the dominant culture only to the
extent that those persons are aware of the existence of cultural norms
other than their own, capable of comprehending unfamiliar ways of
seeing the world, willing to take others' norms seriously as proper
guides for action, and flexible and deferential enough to implement
pluralist insights in ways that are acceptable to members of the sub-
ordinate group.3 2 In practice, an expanded base of experiential infor-
mation can affect social policy only to the extent that insiders permit.
Neither anti-assimilationist purposes nor techniques for broadening
experiential perspectives entails a binding commitment to achieving
cultural pluralism on the part of the majority culture. 3
Consequently, some commentators have advocated a third
strategy for implementing pluralism: legal doctrines that mandate
different treatment for members of different groups.3 4 The potential
benefit of this approach is evident: under an overtly plural legal re-
conscience of the (white) majority. See, for example, Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules:
Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 343 (1991); Charles R. Lawrence III, If
He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 Duke L. J. 431; Matsuda, 87
Mich. L. Rev. 2320 (cited in note 28).
32. The tendency of members of the dominant culture to exercise discretion in assimilation-
ist ways accounts in part for the interest of some minority scholars in defending rights-based
approaches to law. See, for example, Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrench-
ment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331,
1381-84 (1988); Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar. Does Critical Legal Studies Have What
Minorities Want?, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 301, 303-07 (1987); Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women
and the Constitution: Finding Our Place, Asserting Our Rights, 24 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 9, 40-
44 (1989); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed
Rights, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 401, 413 (1987); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Taking Rights
Aggressively: The Perils and Promise of Critical Legal Theory for Peoples of Color, 5 L. & Ineq. J.
103 (1987).
33. For more extended discussion of the ways discretion impacts pluralist values, see
generally the sources cited in note 26.
34. Examples of this approach include: some sex-specific classifications, such as pregnancy
disability leave; overtly race-dependent application of existing legal doctrines, see, for example,
Maclin, 26 Valp. U. L. Rev. 243 (cited in note 9) (arguing that race should be taken into account in
Fourth Amendment seizure cases); nonremedial race-conscious "affirmative action," see Kathleen
M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 78
(1986), and Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Academia,
1990 Duke L. J. 705; and religion-based exemptions from otherwise applicable legal requirements,
as in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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gime 3 5 no individual need be held to standards that are not her own,
culturally speaking. The value of autonomy, at least, would be fully
realized.36 Each would be subject only to the commands of her own
cultural norms.
37
At the same time, the weaknesses of the different treatment, or
categorical, strategy for achieving multiculturalism are equally
evident. Some bases of classification are just culturally impermissible;
different treatment on the basis of race, for example, is often thought
to violate a central equality norm.38 Even when a classification is not
problematic on its face, different treatment almost always carries with
it a message of inferiority.39 Different treatment presupposes a norm
from which those who are "different" diverge; since the majority stan-
dard constitutes that norm, minority values and the different treat-
ment that implements them generally are cast as secondary, deriva-
35. The categorical strategy is closely aligned with a group-rights approach to diversity.
See Post, 76 Cal. L. Rev. at 305 (cited in note 21).
36. There is considerable disagreement whether equality can be achieved in a regime of
categorical differences; the classic example is the debate over the different treatment of women,
as, for instance, in the case of pregnancy disability leave. The two sides are set forth in Linda J.
Krieger and Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action
and the Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 513 (1983) (stating that
biological differences mandate different treatment designed to yield equal outcomes), and Wendy
W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate,
13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 325 (1984-85) (arguing that treatment of pregnancy-related dis-
abilities in the employment context should be based on an androgynous model). It should be
noted that Wendy Williams's approach-seeking to formulate gender-neutral solutions that take
into account the needs of both women and men-is a variant of option number one, the use of dis-
cretion in policyrnaking to accommodate cultural differences. Williams's analysis should make it
clear that it is possible to foster pluralism within the confines of gender-neutral laws.
Of course, the pregnancy disability debate is concerned with biological differences between
women and men. Robin West is a leading proponent of the view that there are, in addition,
important cultural differences between the sexes (that perhaps are themselves biologically based).
See, for example, Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1988); Robin West,
The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory,
3 Wis. Women's L. J. 81 (1987).
37. Thus, regimes of categorical differentiation are distinct from regimes of legal pluralism,
defined as "that state of affairs, for any social field, in which behavior pursuant to more than one
legal order occurs." John Griffiths, What Is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. Legal Pluralism 1, 2 (1986).
See also Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & Soc'y Rev. 869 (1988).
38. See, for example, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding that
all race-specific classifications, including those designed to benefit racial minorities, are subject to
strict judicial scrutiny). This colorblindness conception of equality has been criticized in, for
example, T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Constitution in Context: The Continuing Significance of
Racism, 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 325 (1992); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91
Colum. L. Rev. 1060 (1991); Flagg, 91 Mich. L. Rev. at 1010-13 (cited in note 10); Neil Gotanda, A
Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind," 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1991); Gary Peller, Race
Consciousness, 1990 Duke L. J. 758.
39. This point is developed fully in Martha Minow, Making All the Difference 49-78 (Cornell
U., 1990).
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tive, and at least to that extent, inferior.4 Equality values are again
compromised, though in a different sense. In addition, attempts at
categorical pluralism are necessarily assimilationist to the extent that
a single criterion or set of criteria is necessary to decide which differ-
ences do, and do not, "count.""
The inherent deficiencies of the discretionary and categorical
strategies for implementing cultural pluralism in law impel a search
for alternatives. Several constitutional doctrines appear to embody a
fourth approach-the incorporation of subjective experience as an
element of legal doctrine." This technique has the potential, at least
on its face, to provide for the effectuation of cultural pluralism within
the confines of a single rule uniformly applicable to all. Thus, it seems
to carry neither of the disadvantages described in connection with the
discretionary and categorical strategies. In contrast with the
discretionary approach, employing subjective experience as a
component of legal doctrine would leave a decisionmaker no choice but
to respect the variety of individual experiences. At the same time, the
indeterminate content of that subjective component would circumvent
the normative difficulties associated with the categorical approach.4
For example, housing occupancy ordinances frequently are
drafted in ways that disadvantage lesbian and gay families. Such
ordinances often treat married and unmarried couples differently;
because legal marriage is not an option for same-sex couples, their
housing options are constrained by provisions regulating the number
of "unrelated persons" who may occupy a dwelling unit.4 The first
discretionary strategy would encourage policymakers to formulate
occupancy regulations in a more inclusive manner; for instance, one
might substitute "domestic partners" for "married couple" in existing
40. Id.
41. See Post, 76 Cal. L. Rev. at 314 (cited in note 21).
42. See, for example, text accompanying note 13.
43. However, because pluralist values are mediated through individual experience, this
fourth option does carry the risk of subordinating the interests of a cultural subgroup to the
interests of the individual.
44. For example, University City, Missouri defines "family" as "[a]n individual or married
couple and/or the children thereof with not more than two (2) other persons related directly to the
individual or married couple by blood or marriage; or a group of not more than three (3) persons,
living together as a single housekeeping unit in a dwelling unit." University City, Mo., Property
Maintenance Code § PM-201.0 (1992). A separate provision limits occupancy of a dwelling unit to
a single family, as defined. Id. § PM-403.4 (1992). Together, these ordinances permit individual
adults and married couples to reside as a family with any number of their children, but unmarried
couples, including lesbians and gays, may not have more than one child living with them. These
provisions are typical of housing regulations in the St. Louis, Missouri metropolitan area.
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definitions of "family."45 Under the second discretionary alternative,
officials responsible for enforcing occupancy provisions would simply
"look the other way" with respect to lesbian and gay families. It's
evident, however, that neither of these approaches offers security;
each is effective only to the extent that the authorities are willing and
politically able to pursue it. The third, categorical, option would be
illustrated in this setting by a provision that limited the category of
domestic partners to same-sex couples, for example, by establishing a
city registry for that purpose.4 This approach is designed to place
committed homosexual relationships on a par with heterosexual
marriages. The normative dangers of this strategy should be
apparent; undoubtedly many would view such an ordinance as
granting "special rights" to lesbians and gay men. Finally, the fourth,
subjective, means of implementing pluralist objectives would eschew
any normative definition of "family"; it would allow individuals to
define family relationships for themselves. 47 This subjective approach
seems to combine security and even-handedness. Every family unit
would be afforded the same recognition, and none could be seen as
having been singled out for "special treatment."
Of course, legislation incorporating a subjective definition of
"family" is just another variant of the first strategy-the pursuit of
pluralism in policymaking. In contrast, a subjective definition of
constitutionally protected family interests would have more far-
reaching consequences. In its capacity as a guarantor of individual
rights, setting the limits of permissible government intrusion on
individual autonomy, constitutional law is a uniquely effective arena
in which to employ the subjective experience strategy for
implementing multiculturalism. Thus, this Article will focus on the
use of subjective experience as a component of constitutional doctrine.
The logical way to begin examining the strategy of appeals to
subjectivity is by exploring the settings in which it already appears to
45. In the example cited in note 44, for instance, the revised ordinance would read:
"Family: An individual or two (2) domestic partners and/or the children thereof. . . ." I use
"domestic partners" in this example to include same-sex couples and unmarried heterosexuals.
46. To date, domestic partnership ordinances have defined the category in ways inclusive of
heterosexual partnerships. See, for example, Minneapolis Municipal Code, Title 7, Ch. 142.20
(1991); San Francisco Admin. Code § 62.2 (1991). Some private corporations, however, have
extended domestic partnership benefits only to partners of homosexual employees. See Sandra
Sugawara, Firm Widens Benefits for Gay Employees, Washington Post Al (Sept. 7, 1991).
47. Until September 1993, St. Charles, Missouri, defined "family" as "[a]n individual or two
(2) or more persons who are related by blood or marriage living together and occupying a single
housekeeping unit, or a group of persons living together by joint agreement and occupying a
single housekeeping unit." St. Charles, Mo., Code § 30-5 (1992).
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be in use. Part III of this Article examines several representative
constitutional doctrines and reaches the conclusion that in application,
the strategy falls well short of its promise; in practice, doctrines that
seem to incorporate appeals to subjective experience tend to have anti-
pluralist consequences. However, consideration of the subjective
experience strategy should not be abandoned too hastily. Part IV
speculates on the reasons existing attempts to employ this approach
have been unsuccessful in pluralist terms and sets forth guidelines for
its more productive use. As this Article will show, subjective
experience can be a fruitful doctrinal mechanism, if employed with
caution in the context of pluralism-regarding constitutional provisions.
III. A REVIEW OF REPRESENTATIVE CASES
This Part contains descriptive analyses of representative
constitutional cases in which the Supreme Court, or individual
Justices, seemingly have appealed to subjective experience as a
ground of decision.48 Subjective experience appears to have been
employed as an element of doctrine in two substantive areas: the
Fourth Amendment subjective expectation of privacy cases and
certain Establishment Clause cases, in which government action is
measured against a test, proposed by Justice O'Connor, that regards
as impermissible activity that sends messages of endorsement of
religion. 41
The Fourth Amendment is a pluralism-regarding constitutional
provision only in the same sense as any individual rights guarantee: it
is designed to limit the manner in which government may intrude on
48. There are, of course, other constitutional doctrines that appear to appeal to subjectivity;
the question whether an individual has waived his or her Miranda rights is one example. See
North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979) (stating that the relevant test is "whether the
defendant in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights delineated in the Miranda case").
In general, the doctrines that seemingly appeal to subjective experience, but are not reviewed in
this Article, exhibit patterns similar to those that are described herein.
49. Justice O'Connor's "messages of endorsement" test has not been adopted by a majority
of the Court, but it has influenced the majority's analysis in several cases. See, for example,
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987) (quoting from Justice O'Connor's concurrence in
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Services for the Blind,
474 U.S. 481, 488-89 (1986) (referring to a "message of state endorsement of religion" and citing
O'Connor's Lynch concurrence with approval); Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373,
389 (1985) (stating that when a message of endorsement is conveyed, "a core purpose of the
Establishment Clause is violated," and citing Justice O'Connor's Lynch concurrence with ap-




individuals' lives ° At the same time, the doctrines that implement
Fourth Amendment values must be responsive to the need of law
enforcement officials for bright-line rules that efficiently guide conduct
in the field.51 In this sense, the Fourth Amendment is not a provision
deeply infused with pluralist norms. Nevertheless, the existing doc-
trine that defines a Fourth Amendment "search" purports to incorpo-
rate a subjective component. Part III.A examines and evaluates this
ostensible doctrinal appeal to subjectivity; I conclude that in its actual
operation, this doctrinal strategy has anti-pluralist consequences.
In contrast with the Fourth Amendment, the Religion Clauses
clearly are designed to promote pluralist values.2 Thus, the Estab-
lishment Clause should provide fertile ground for the incorporation of
subjective experience as a doctrinal component. However, Part III.B
describes the ways the "effects" prong of Justice O'Connor's "messages
of endorsement" test also falls short with respect to pluralist values.
Finally, Part III.C describes three unrelated cases in which
individual Justices appealed to subjective experience in support of
positions they articulated in dissent. Of course, none of these cases
represents the full doctrinal development of the element of subjectivity
to which the appeal was made. Nevertheless, each will be useful in
Part IV for fleshing out the implications of the Fourth Amendment
and Establishment Clause cases with respect to the circumstances in
which appeal to subjective experience is appropriate, and the guide-
lines that should be followed when it is.
A. The Fourth Amendment: Subjective Expectations of Privacy
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or af-
firmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized.3
50. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev.
349,367 (1974).
51. See Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1468,
1473 (1985).
52. See Karst, 64 N.C. L. Rev. at 357-61 (cited in note 10); Michael W. McConnell, Accom-
modation of Religion, 1985 S. Ct. Rev. 1, 1.
53. U.S. Const., Amend. IV.
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The warrant, probable cause, and reasonableness requirements of the
Fourth Amendment apply only to governmental searches and sei-
zures; accordingly, whether an official activity is a "search" (or a
"seizure") is a crucial first step in determining whether Fourth
Amendment guarantees have been violated.M
The Supreme Court has recognized that not every official inva-
sion or examination of one's person or property is a "search" in the
constitutional sense. The current test was first set forth in Katz v.
United States 55 which addressed the question whether electronic
surveillance of a telephone conversation constitutes a Fourth Amend-
ment search. The case required the Court to reconsider its previous
focus on the concept of "constitutionally protected areas" because the
facts presented no physical intrusion into such an area: the FBI had
attached an electronic listening device to the exterior of a public
telephone booth regularly used by Katz. The Court concluded that a
trespass-like analysis was no longer appropriate:
[Tihe Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected., 6
Therefore, even though Katz was visible to others through the glass of
the telephone booth, his conversations were what he intended to keep
private, and so he did not automatically relinquish protection of his
conversations by using a public telephone. Moreover, the Court held
that physical intrusion was not a necessary condition of a Fourth
Amendment search. 57
The Court's new analysis of what constitutes a "search" was
elaborated by Justice Harlan in a concurring opinion:
[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and second, that the expectation be one
that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable." Thus a man's home is,
for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or
statements that he exposes to the "plain view" of outsiders are not "protected"
because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited. On the
other hand, conversations in the open would not be protected against being
54. A comprehensive treatment of the relevant Fourth Amendment doctrine and principles
can be found in Wayne R. LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment §§
2.1-2.7 (West, 2d ed. 1987).
55. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
56. Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
57. Id. at 353.
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overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the circumstances would be
unreasonable.5
Justice Harlan's formulation of the Katz rule soon became the version
most often adopted by the lower courts 59 and was accepted by a ma-
jority of the Supreme Court in 1979.60
Note first that the "actual (subjective) expectation" prong of
Justice Harlan's test is not genuinely subjective.61 The requirement is
that the individual "have exhibited" a subjective expectation of
privacy, which is to say that the existence of such an expectation is
tested ultimately by an objective standard-the individual's conduct.62
Claims of actual subjective expectations of privacy that arise in
connection with types of behavior ordinarily thought not to manifest
such expectations will not be credited. For example, a grower who
placed a marijuana plant on his front porch, in a location easily visible
from the street, would not be heard to argue that he had a subjective
58. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Note, however, that Justice Harlan soon repudiated
the "subjective" component of his Katz formulation. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971),
presented the question whether government eavesdropping on a conversation via a microphone
voluntarily attached to one of the participants constituted a search in the Fourth Amendment
sense. The Court concluded that it did not; a plurality reasoned that the defendant had assumed
the risk of exposure when he voluntarily conveyed information to another. Justice Harlan wrote
in dissent:
The analysis must, in my view, transcend the search for subjective expectations or
legal attributions of assumptions of risk. Our expectations, and the risks we assume, are
in large part reflections of laws that translate into rules the customs and values of the
past and present.
Since it is the task of the law to form and project, as well as to mirror and reflect,
we should not, as judges, merely recite the expectations and risks without examining the
desirability of saddling them upon society. The critical question, therefore, is whether
under our system of government, as reflected in the Constitution, we should impose on
our citizens the risks of the electronic listener or observer without at least the protection
of a warrant requirement.
The question must, in my view, be answered by assessing the nature of a particular
practice and the likely extent of its impact on the individual's sense of security balanced
against the utility of the conduct as a technique of law enforcement.
Id. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
This argument will be considered further at notes 208-13 and accompanying text.
59. See LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure § 2.1(b) at 306 & n.48 (cited in note 54).
60. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
61. See Eric Dean Bender, Note, The Fourth Amendment in the Age of Aerial Surveillance:
Curtains for the Curtilage?, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 725, 743-44 (1985). This is not to suggest that this
element can or should be purely subjective in the strict sense.
62. James Tomkovicz has noted as well that there is a choice to be made between the
expectation of the particular individual and the expectations of 'people in general." James J.
Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy's Sake: Toward an Expanded Vision of the Fourth
Amendment Privacy Province, 36 Hastings L. J. 645, 653 (1985). The latter approach would
convert the first prong into the equivalent of a "reasonable person" standard. Id. at 678 n.142.
See note 205 and accompanying text.
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expectation of privacy because he didn't think anyone would notice
it.63
The second prong of Justice Harlan's test requires that a sub-
jective expectation of privacy "be one that society is prepared to recog-
nize as 'reasonable."' There are two distinct concepts of reasonable-
ness embedded here.64 The example Justice Harlan presents, a con-
versation held where others might overhear, represents what I'll call
empirical unreasonableness: even a subjectively held expectation of
privacy may be characterized as unreasonable if, in the observer's
view, the empirical risk of exposure is significantly greater than the
individual subject realizes. For example, it's empirically unreasonable
to assume complete privacy in a conversation carried on in the
presence of bystanders. However, there is another sense of
unreasonableness that might appropriately be applied in this context.
One might pursue the normative inquiry whether a given subjective
expectation of privacy is one that should be afforded constitutional
protection. That is, a subjective expectation of privacy is normatively
reasonable if, and only if, it represents the sort of interest the Fourth
Amendment is designed to protect.6 5
This inherent ambiguity in the notion of reasonableness ac-
counts for the tendency of courts to conflate the two parts of Justice
Harlan's Katz test.6 6 The first prong implicates an assessment of
reasonableness in the empirical sense, as a means of resolving the
question whether an individual has exhibited a subjective expectation
63. The implications of the fact that subjective experience must be "exhibited" in some
objectively identifiable manner will be explored in the text accmpanying notes 223-40.
64. Neither should be confused with the general Fourth Amendment requirement that a
search or seizure be "reasonable"; the issue here is whether Fourth Amendment requirements are
applicable at all.
65. This distinction between empirical and normative reasonableness was recognized, in dif-
ferent terms, in Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth
Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 968, 982-83 (1968). Mary Coombs appears to employ
the terms "empirical" and "normative" in the sense used in this Article. See Mary I. Coombs,
Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of Relationships, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 1593,
1614 (1987).
66. See Wayne R. LaFave, The Forgotten Motto of Obsta Principiis in Fourth Amendment
Jurisprudence, 28 Ariz. L. Rev. 291, 297 (1986).
The first prong briefly was afforded independent significance in California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207 (1986), in which Chief Justice Rehnquist apparently conceded that building a double
fence-the outer one six feet high and the inner one ten feet high-manifested a subjective
expectation of privacy with respect to the marijuana plants growing within. Id. at 211. However,
the Court immediately cast doubt on its own assessment, arguing (a) that it need not address the
issue because the state had conceded the point, (b) that the plants might have been visible from
the top of a double-decker bus, and (c) intimating that manifesting a subjective expectation of
privacy in regard to observations from the ground might not be dispositive of the question as to
observations from the air. Id. at 211-12. See LaFave, 28 Ariz. L. Rev. at 297-98.
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of privacy.67 The second prong should be concerned only with the
normative dimension of reasonableness; at this stage the analysis
should explicitly articulate and address relevant Fourth Amendment
values.68 However, an examination of the cases in which the Supreme
Court has resolved the question whether a subjectively held expecta-
tion of privacy is "reasonable" reveals that the Court almost always
relies on its empirical, rather than its normative, connotation.6
9
In some cases the Court has resolved the empirical reasonable-
ness question by relying on the fact that the individual voluntarily
exposed relevant information to public view. For example, in United
States v. Knotts,7 0 narcotics investigators had placed a beeper inside a
container of chemicals they believed to be destined for use in the
manufacture of illicit drugs. The beeper enabled them to trace the
container from its point of purchase to its ultimate destination at a
secluded cabin. In regard to the question whether the government's
use of the beeper to track the defendant's automobile constituted a
search for Fourth Amendment purposes, the Court said:
A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.
When Petschen traveled over the public streets he voluntarily conveyed to
anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was traveling over particular
roads in a particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he made, and the
fact of his final destination when he exited from public roads onto private
property.
7'
67. To spell it out, characterizing behavior as empirically reasonable in this sense is to say
that the behavior manifests a subjective intent to preserve privacy; describing conduct as
empirically unreasonable is to say that a reasonable person who subjectively intended to keep a
matter private would not have behaved in that manner because the empirical risk of exposure
was too great.
68. Wayne LaFave has argued quite persuasively that the normative inquiry should be the
focus of the Court's analysis. LaFave, 28 Ariz. L. Rev. at 299 (cited in note 66) (quoting Erwin
Griswold, Search and Seizure: A Dilemma of the Supreme Court 39 (U. of Nebraska, 1975), and
Amsterdam, 58 Minn. L. Rev. at 403 (cited in note 50)). See also Justice Harlan's dissent in White,
quoted in relevant part in note 58. However, these commentators appear to take the view that
the normative inquiry should be the exclusive avenue of analysis in these cases, a position I do not
fully endorse. See notes 208-13 and accompanying text.
69. For representative general criticism of the Katz test, see Roger B. Dworkin, Fact Style
Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Lawyering, 48 Ind. L. J. 329, 334-38
(1973); Edmund W. Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 1968 S.
Ct. Rev. 133, 137-40; Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the
Innocent, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 1229, 1248-56 (1983); Richard G. Wilkins, Defining the 'Reasonable Ex-
pectation of Privacy": An Emerging Tripartite Analysis, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 1077, 1086-96 (1987).
70. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
71. Id. at 281-82. The Court's implicit claim of reliance on empirically reasonable expecta-
tions was underscored a year later in United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984), which held that
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Similarly, in California v. Greenwood,72  the Court held that
individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the garbage
placed outside the home for collection by a regular garbage collection
service. The Court reasoned that "respondents exposed their garbage
to the public sufficiently to defeat their claim to Fourth Amendment
protection. It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on
or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals,
children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public."73
Empirical reasonableness analysis has played a subsidiary role
in another line of cases, in which defendants voluntarily revealed to
third parties information that in turn was passed along to government
authorities. The disposition of these cases has rested primarily on a
normative analysis: the Court has adopted the view that in conveying
the information in question to another, the individual assumes the
risk that it then may be shared with others, including government
officials.14  However, an empirical element is present as well. The
scope of the risk the individual is deemed to have assumed logically
must be coextensive with the extent of the information voluntarily
conveyed. 75 Thus, it's important to determine the range of information
actually voluntarily conveyed. In United States v. Miller,76 for
instance, the prosecution introduced various bank records in support
of its case that the defendant had operated an illegal distilling opera-
tion. Regarding the defendant's motion to suppress the bank
documents, the Supreme Court concluded that he had no legitimate
77
"the monitoring of a beeper in a private residence, a location not open to visual surveillance,"
constitutes a search with respect to those having a privacy interest in the residence. Id. at 714
(emphasis added). It's not entirely clear, however, whether the location of the beeper within a
residence, or the fact that it revealed information "that could not have been obtained through vis-
ual surveillance," was of primary significance in Karo. See LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure § 2.7(d)
at 530-31 (cited in note 54).
72. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
73. Id. at 40 (footnotes omitted).
74. On this assumption of risk reasoning, see Tracey Maclin, Constructing Fourth Amend-
ment Principles from the Government Perspective: Whose Amendment Is It, Anyway?, 25 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 669, 681-83 (1988). See generally JoAnn Guzik, Note, The Assumption of Risk
Doctrine: Erosion of Fourth Amendment Protection Through Fictitious Consent to Search and
Seizure, 22 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1051 (1982).
75. Consequently, if, as this Article will argue, the Court's empirical assessment is mis-
taken, the individual may be seen to have assumed a greater (or lesser) risk of exposure than ac-
tually is warranted. See text accompanying notes 92-110.
76. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
77. Clark Cunningham has pointed out that Miller marks the point at which the Court
began to substitute "legitimate" for "reasonable" expectations of privacy. Clark D. Cunningham,
A Linguistic Analysis of the Meanings of "Search" in the Fourth Amendment: A Search for
Common Sense, 73 Iowa L. Rev. 541, 578-83 (1988). While my angle of analysis is somewhat
different than his, I agree that the shift has significance. In my view, it exacerbates the confusion
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expectation of privacy in them: "All of the documents obtained,
including financial statements and deposit slips, contain only
information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their
employees in the ordinary course of business.."78 Similarly, in Smith v.
Maryland79 the Court held that an individual has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed from the telephone in his
own home. The investigative activity at issue in that case was the
installation, at a central telephone office, of a pen register on the
defendant's home telephone line. Again, the Court concluded that the
information in question had been voluntarily exposed to others.2
A second, distinct aspect of the question of empirical reason-
ableness is illustrated by cases in which the Court concluded that
measures taken to preserve privacy were not effective as an empirical
matter. For example, Oliver v. United States", addressed the continu-
ing post-Katz validity of the "open fields" doctrine, which denies
Fourth Amendment protection to areas so characterized.2 Narcotics
investigators entered Oliver's property to search for marijuana plants
in spite of a locked entrance gate and posted "No Trespassing" signs.
In the course of reaffirming the open fields rule, the Court touched on
empirical reasonableness:
[A]s a practical matter these lands usually are accessible to the public and
the police in ways that a home, an office, or commercial structure would not
be. It is not generally true that fences or "No Trespassing" signs effectively
bar the public from viewing open fields in rural areas. And both petitioner
between empirical and normative reasonableness to the extent that "legitimate" has a distinctly
normative connotation.
78. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
79. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
80. The Court opined: "When he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical
information to the telephone company and 'exposed' that information to its equipment in the
ordinary course of business. In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the company would re-
veal to police the numbers he dialed." Id. at 744.
A third case follows this pattern as well. In California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), the
Court supplemented the "exposure to the public" argument described above in the text
accompanying notes 70-73 with an assumption of the risk approach: "[R]espondents placed their
refuse at the curb for the express purpose of conveying it to a third party, the trash collector, who
might himself have sorted through respondents' trash or permitted others, such as the police, to
do so." Id. at 40.
81. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
82. The "open fields" doctrine was set forth in Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59
(1924). For an argument that the doctrine should not have survived Katz, see LaFave, 1 Search
and Seizure § 2.4(a) at 426-29 (cited in note 54).
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Oliver and respondent Thornton concede that the public and police lawfully
may survey lands from the air.88
In California v. Ciraolo8 the Court, apparently with some reluc-
tance, 5 acknowledged the existence of a subjective expectation of
privacy in a back yard completely enclosed by a six-foot outer fence
and a ten-foot inner fence. However, defendant's expectation of pri-
vacy was judged unreasonable with respect to observation of the en-
closure by police from an aircraft flying at an altitude of 1000 feet:
"Any member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down
could have seen everything that these officers observed."8 Even the
individual who erects the elaborate fencing present in this case is not,
the Court said, "'entitled to assume' his unlawful conduct will not be
observed by a passing aircraft-or by a power company repair
mechanic on a pole overlooking the yard."87
The most recent in this line of subjective expectation of privacy
cases is also the one that most explicitly turns on a question of empiri-
cal reasonableness. The issue presented in Florida v. Riley was
whether surveillance of a greenhouse and its contents from a helicop-
ter flying at an altitude of 400 feet constituted a Fourth Amendment
83. 466 U.S. at 179. At the same time, the Court proffered a more explicitly normative
basis for the holding: 'There is no societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities,
such as the cultivation of crops, that occur in open fields." Id. For a discussion criticizing both the
empirical and normative aspects of Oliver, see generally Stephen A. Saltzburg, Another Victim of
Illegal Narcotics: The Fourth Amendment (As Illustrated by the Open Fields Doctrine), 48 U. Pitt.
L. Rev. 1 (1986).
84. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
85. See note 66.
86. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-14. The relevance of the observer's vantage point was under-
scored in Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989). A plurality of the Court indicated that a distinc-
tion should be made between subjective expectations of privacy with respect to observation from
the ground and from the air:
Riley no doubt intended and expected that his greenhouse would not be open to public in-
spection, and the precautions he took protected against ground-level observation. Be-
cause the sides and roof of his greenhouse were left partially open, however, what was
growing in the greenhouse was subject to viewing from the air. Under the holding in
Ciraolo, Riley could not reasonably have expected the contents of his greenhouse to be
immune from examination by an officer seated in a fixed-wing aircraft flying in navigable
airspace at an altitude of 1,000 feet....
Id. at 450 (plurality opinion). None of the remaining five Justices took issue with this vantage-
point distinction, and indeed their analyses imply agreement with the plurality on this question.
87. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 214-15. In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986),
a case decided the same day as Ciraolo, the Court applied similar reasoning to the aerial surveil-
lance by an administrative agency of a commercial chemical manufacturing complex, even though
the surveillance technique required the use of a sophisticated and expensive aerial mapping
camera. The complex, the Court held, was 'open to the view and observation of persons in
aircraft lawfully in the public airspace immediately above or sufficiently near the area for the
reach of cameras." Id. at 239.
88. 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
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search. A plurality of the Court concluded that the defendant's sub-
jective expectation of privacy was not reasonable, largely because the
flight did not violate applicable flight regulations. 9 Five Justices,
however, agreed that the proper inquiry was whether there was suffi-
cient flight activity at 400 feet to render the defendant's subjective
expectation of privacy from the air empirically unreasonable:
If the public rarely, if ever, travels overhead at such altitudes, the observation
cannot be said to be from a vantage point generally used by the public and
Riley cannot be said to have "knowingly expose[d]" his greenhouse to public
view. However, if the public can generally be expected to travel over resi-
dential backyards at an altitude of 400 feet, Riley cannot reasonably expect
his curtilage to be free from such aerial observation. 90
Nevertheless, the Court held that the surveillance was not a search
for constitutional purposes because Justice O'Connor concluded that
the defendant had not met his burden of proof with respect to the
rarity of helicopter overflights.9'
In sum, the Supreme Court repeatedly has found it appropriate
to appeal to a notion of empirical reasonableness to defeat claims to
Fourth Amendment protection. If, in the Court's judgment, there is a
basis for concluding that information an individual subjectively de-
sires to keep private nevertheless has been exposed to some segment
of the public, or to a party to a business transaction, government ac-
quisition of that information will not constitute a Fourth Amendment
search. However, the Court's application of this empirical sense of
reasonableness frequently is implausible.92 In a clear majority of the
89. Id. at 451 (White, J., writing for the plurality) (stating, "We would have a different case
if flying at that altitude had been contrary to law or regulation."); id. at 452 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (stating, "In my view, the plurality's approach rests the scope of Fourth Amendment
protection too heavily on compliance with FAA regulations. . . ."); id. at 456 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (noting, "[The plurality] opinion relies almost exclusively on the fact that the police
officer conducted his surveillance from a vantage point where, under applicable Federal Aviation
Administration regulations, he had a legal right to be.").
90. 488 U.S. at 455 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also id. at 464-65 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (explaining that "I find little to disagree with in Justice O'Connor's concurrence, apart from
its closing paragraphs. A majority of the Court thus agrees that the fundamental inquiry is ...
whether Riley's expectation of privacy was rendered illusory by the extent of public observation of
his backyard from aerial traffic at 400 feet."); id. at 467 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that
"Justice Brennan, the two Justices who have joined him, and Justice O'Connor all believe that the
reasonableness of Riley's expectation depends, in large measure, on the frequency of nonpolice
helicopter flights at an altitude of 400 feet. Again, I agree.").
91. Id. at 455 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor thus provided the fifth vote for
the proposition that Riley's expectation of privacy was not reasonable.
92. Critical commentary on this aspect of the cases has been extensive. Examples include
Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the "Legitimate Expectation of Privacy," 34
Vand. L. Rev. 1289, 1313-17 (1981); John M. Burkoff, When Is a Search Not a "Search?" Fourth
296 [Vol. 47:273
1994] ALGEBRA OFPLURALISM 297
above cases, the actual extent, or risk, of exposure of activities or
information that the individual intended to keep private seems to
have been significantly less than the Court apparently considered it to
be.
9 3
In three of these cases, Miller, Smith, and Greenwood, the vol-
untary activity at issue involved exposure of personal information, in
the course of a routine business transaction, to the other party in-
volved. Each case rested ultimately upon the normative judgment
that the individual had assumed the risk, "in revealing his affairs to
another, that the information [would] be conveyed by that person to
the Government," 94 a proposition that itself is the object of extensive
Amendment Doublethink, 15 U. Toledo L. Rev. 515, 537-41 (1984); Clifford S. Fishman, Pen
Registers and Privacy: Risks, Expectations, and the Nullification of Congressional Intent, 29
Cath. U. L. Rev. 557, 566-74 (1980); Peter Goldberger, Consent, Expectations of Privacy, and the
Meaning of "Searches" in the Fourth Amendment, 75 J. Crim. L. & Criminol. 319, 329-33 (1984);
Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-first Century, 65 Ind. L. J. 549,
564-67 (1990); Wayne R. LaFave, Fourth Amendment Vagaries (Of Improbable Cause, Impercepti-
ble Plain View, Notorious Privacy, and Balancing Askew), 74 J. Crim. L. & Criminol. 1171, 1172-
78 (1983); Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 S.
Ct. Rev. 173, 209-13; Robert C. Power, Technology and the Fourth Amendment: A Proposed
Formulation for Visual Searches, 80 J. Crim. L. & Criminol. 1, 24-53 (1989); Brian J. Serr, Great
Expectations of Privacy: A New Model for Fourth Amendment Protection, 73 Minn. L. Rev. 583,
598-623 (1989); David E. Steinberg, Making Sense of Sense-Enhanced Searches, 74 Minn. L. Rev.
563, 601-05 (1990); Tomkovicz, 36 Hastings L. J. at 690-93 (cited in note 62); H. Richard Uviller,
Evidence from the Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A Reconsideration of the Current Rules of Access
and Restraint, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1137, 1195-1209 (1987).
93. A recent empirical study provides some additional support for the argument that
follows. Two researchers undertook to examine existing expectations of privacy by "obtain[ing]
information about how people react to various types of investigations undertaken by the police."
Christopher Slobogin and Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and
Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings Recognized and
Permitted by Society," 42 Duke L. J. 727, 733 (1993). Subjects in the study were asked to rate on
an "Intrusiveness Rating Scale" (ranging from 0, representing "Not At All Intrusive," to 100,
representing "Extremely Intrusive") 50 hypothetical situations in which persons or property were
searched or seized by government agents. Id. at 735-36. In addition, they were asked to assume
that the individual, or owner of the property, at issue was innocent and that the search or seizure
was nonconsensual. Id. at 736. The results of the survey were compiled to produce a ranking of
the 50 hypotheticals, which revealed that, for example, "Looking in foliage in public park" was
deemed least intrusive (Mean = 6.48; Rank = 1) and "Body cavity search at border" was seen as
most intrusive (Mean = 90.14; Rank = 50). Id. at 738-39.
Because the survey tested attitudes regarding searches by government agents, it has a
somewhat different focus than the arguments presented in this Article, which revolve around ex-
pectations concerning exposure of private information to the public. Nevertheless, the study
constitutes an interesting addition to the already substantial criticism of the Court's interpreta-
tion of societal attitudes, and indirectly contributes to the argument that its empirical assess-
ments often are erroneous as well.
94. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (emphasis added). The Court grounded this proposition in a
series of previously decided "participant monitoring" cases, in which the Court held that the
government did not conduct a Fourth Amendment search when one party to a conversation wore
a concealed microphone. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); On Lee v. United States,
343 U.S. 747 (1952).
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criticism . 5  However, each outcome also turned on an empirical as-
sessment of the extent of the voluntary disclosure;96 these assessments
are not persuasive.97 In Miller, the government was interested in an
overall pattern of activity that in all likelihood would not have been
apparent to the bank's employees 8 In Smith, the Court argued that
telephone users in fact do not "harbor any general expectation that
the numbers they dial will remain secret."99 The accuracy of this
claim depends on the actual practices of a given telephone company
and the degree to which its practices are made apparent to the aver-
age service subscriber. The best evidence of each would seem to be
the subscriber's telephone bill. If, as the Court's discussion in Smith
suggests, 1°° the telephone company ordinarily identified and billed
individually for long distance but not local calls, the most empirically
reasonable assumption would appear to be that no records of the
latter were being kept. Finally, the Court's observation in Greenwood
that the trash collector might have sorted through the trash left at
For discussion of this aspect of the cases, see Cunningham, 73 Iowa L. Rev. at 581 (cited in
note 77); Joseph D. Grano, Perplexing Questions About Three Basic Fourth Amendment Issues:
Fourth Amendment Activity, Probable Cause, and the Warrant Requirement, 69 J. Crim. L. &
Criminol. 425, 438-44 (1978); Maclin, 25 Am. Crim. L. Rev. at 681-82 (cited in note 74); Guzik,
Note, 22 Santa Clara L. Rev. at 1064-66 (cited in note 74).
95. It should be apparent that exposure to private individuals is not equivalent to exposure
to the government in the perception of ordinary persons. "The fact that our ordinary social
intercourse, uncontrolled by government, imposes certain risks upon us hardly means that
government is constitutionally unconstrained in adding to those risks." Amsterdam, 58 Minn. L.
Rev. at 406 (cited in note 50); "[The enormous power of government makes the potential
consequences of its snooping into people's private lives far more ominous than those of snooping
by a private individual or firm.' Posner, 1979 S. Ct. Rev. at 176 (cited in note 92);
[In several cases the Court] failed to appreciate that "[p]rivacy is not a discrete
commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all," and that there is a dramatic difference, in
privacy terms, between revealing bits and pieces of information sporadically to a small
and often select group for a limited purpose and a focused police examination of the
totality of that information regarding a particular individual.
LaFave, 28 Ariz. L. Rev. at 304 (cited in note 66) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749
(1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
96. See text accompanying notes 74-80.
97. Justice Marshall set forth perhaps the best general statement of this criticism: "Privacy
is not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all. Those who disclose certain facts to
a bank or phone company for a limited business purpose need not assume that this information
will be released to other persons for other purposes." Smith, 442 U.S. at 749 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). See also LaFave, 28 Ariz L. Rev. at 297-99 (cited in note 66).
98. Slobogin and Schumacher's empirical study revealed a relatively high perception of
intrusiveness regarding "Perusing bank records" by the police: Mean = 71.60; Rank = 38.
Slobogin and Schumacher, 42 Duke L. J. at 738 (cited in note 93).
99. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743.
100. See id. at 745 (arguing, in response to the contention that the telephone company in
that case usually did not record local calls, that "[tihe fortuity of whether or not the phone
company in fact elects to make a quasi-permanent record of a particular number dialed does not,
in our view, make any constitutional difference").
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curbside '°o does not appear to reflect reality. One might foresee, or be
expected to foresee, the possibility that a trash collector, or other
employees of the disposal company, might sift through garbage, but
that is most likely to occur after one's discards have been commingled
with those of others. It is far more likely that one's refuse would be
searched by someone hoping to discover items of value, in which in-
stance the seeker would be relatively unconcerned with the identity of
the items' previous owner, than by an individual interested in uncov-
ering information about the person who discarded the material
searched. o2
The remaining cases raised questions concerning the extent to
which private information had been revealed to the public, either
voluntarily or involuntarily through underestimation of the empirical
chance that the matter in question would be exposed to public view.
In most of these cases, the investigation that took place was much
more focused and particularized than the scrutiny one would expect to
result from exposure to the public.o 3 In Knotts, for example, any
member of the public could have observed the defendant traveling on
public roads, but it's highly unlikely that any would have been inter-
ested in tracing his entire route from Minneapolis, Minnesota to Shell
Lake, Wisconsin. 0 4 In Oliver, police had to bypass a locked gate and a
"No Trespassing" sign to enter the suspect's property. To the extent
that an ordinary member of the public who behaved similarly would
have been subject to trespass sanctions, the Court's claim that the
fields in question were accessible to the public greatly overstates the
101. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40-41.
102. Searching celebrities' trash for personal information might be one exception. See
Editorial, Washington Post A18 (July 10, 1975) (discussing the search of Henry Kissinger's
garbage).
103. See LaFave, 28 Ariz. L. Rev. at 301 (cited in note 66). Similar reasoning applies to the
cases in which information was voluntarily conveyed in the course of a business transaction. In
Miller, for example, the official investigation was more focused than any bank observation would
have been, because specific records were sought only subsequent to the development of other in-
criminating evidence; the bank records in that case would not have been meaningful standing
alone. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 437-38.
104. In LaFave's words, "Only an army of bystanders, conveniently strung out on the route
and who not only 'wanted to look' but also wanted to pass on what they observed to the next in
line, would-to use the language in Knotts-have sufficed to reveal all of these facts to the
police.'" LaFave, 28 Ariz L. Rev. at 303-04 (cited in note 66). In addition, the Court's claim that
the defendant's route over the public streets was a matter open to "anyone who wanted to look"
was belied by the fact that at one point the pursuing officers lost visual contact with the suspect;
they were able to resume the surveillance only with the aid of a helicopter, which was able to pick
up the beeper signal approximately an hour after it had been lost. United States v. Knotts, 460
U.S. 276, 278, 281 (1983).
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practical risk of intrusion.0 5 Similarly, in Ciraolo and Riley the inves-
tigative activity was conducted by air, in a relatively low-flying craft,
and with particular attention to the defendants' property.'06 Persons
flying in the ordinary course of events over the property at issue
probably would have experienced difficulty identifying either the
particular plot or the specific nature of the items claimed to be
"visible" from the air:
[Tihe actual risk to privacy from commercial or pleasure aircraft is virtually
nonexistent. Travelers on commercial flights, as well as private planes used
for business or personal reasons, normally obtain at most a fleeting,
anonymous, and nondiscriminating glimpse of the landscape and buildings
over which they pass. The risk that a passenger on such a plane might ob-
serve private activities, and might connect those activities with particular
people, is simply too trivial to protect against. 0 7
Greenwood may provide the lone "exception to the rule"; there
the Court's empirical assessment may have been relatively accurate.' °8
Because the garbage at issue in Greenwood had been placed outdoors
in plastic bags easily torn open by animals as well as humans, it
105. In these two cases, Slobogin and Schumacher's study is somewhat at variance with the
argument presented in the text. Their survey scored "Using a beeper to track car" at Mean =
54.46; Rank = 18, and "Search of cornfields surrounded by fence and 'No Trespassing' signs" at
Mean = 56.58; Rank = 21. Slobogin and Schumacher, 42 Duke L. J. at 738 (cited in note 93).
Note, however, that both have mean scores above 50.
106. Dow Chemical presents similar facts, with the exception that the aircraft was flying at
higher altitudes, a disadvantage ameliorated by the use of a sophisticated aerial surveillance
camera. See Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 229 (1986).
107. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 223-24 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Or, as Wayne
LaFave puts it:
[The claim that any member of the flying public could have seen into Ciraolo's yard]
brings to mind my most recent experience with air travel, my flight to Tucson just a few
days ago. As we started our descent to the Tucson Airport, I glanced out the window to
the terrain below and then exclaimed to my wife, "I'll be damned, Loretta, look what Paul
Marcus has growing in his backyard!"
LaFave, 2.8 Ariz. L. Rev. at 300 (cited in note 66). A similar, though less colorful, argument was
advanced in Riley, 488 U.S. at 465 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The Riley surveillance was viewed as relatively unintrusive by the subjects in the Slobogin
and Schumacher study. The hypothetical "Flying 400 yards above backyard in helicopter" scored
Mean = 40.32 and Rank = 10. Slobogin and Schumacher, 42 Duke L. J. at 738 (cited in note 93).
This result is not entirely inconsistent with the Riley dissenters' assessment of empirical
reasonableness. First, the hypothetical does not necessarily reflect the Riley facts. Its intrusive.
ness score likely would have been higher had it been phrased as "Hovering 400 feet above
backyard in helicopter." Second, even if the perceived intrusiveness of 'hovering" were as low as
the "flying" hypothetical suggests, it is possible for either activity to be relatively unintrusive but
nevertheless rare.
108. The empirical study tends to support this conclusion. "Going through garbage in opaque
bags at curbside" was seen as relatively unintrusive, even when conducted by the police. The
Mean for this hypothetical was 44.95; Rank = 13. Slobogin and Schumacher, 42 Duke L. J. at 738-
39 (cited in note 93).
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wasn't wholly inappropriate to conclude that there was a relatively
high risk of exposure of the contents to public view. 10 Even in this
case, however, the trash in fact was exposed to an unusually intense
and specific degree of scrutiny.110
Taken together, the subjective expectation of privacy cases
exhibit a stunning inability on the Court's part to assess empirical
reasonableness in a plausible manner. It's not too difficult to
construct an explanation, however. First, the empirical question in
these cases generally has functioned to forestall candid discussion of
the problem of normative "reasonableness."'" This displacement of
normative concerns that should be the central focusll2 of the Fourth
Amendment analysis"1 is made possible in part by the ambiguity in
the notion of reasonableness described earlier." 4 This ambiguity
permits the Court to move back and forth between the two inquiries
without acknowledging that it is doing so. Accordingly, the best
explanation for the implausibility of the Court's empirical
109. It does not follow that Greenwood assumed the risk of exposure to the police. See note
95.
110. The Court's assessments of empirical reasonableness are defective on a third front as
well: In several cases defendants had made some extraordinary effort to conceal their activity
from public view. In Knotts the individual under surveillance had made evasive driving maneu-
vers; the Oliver defendant had locked his gate and posted "No Trespassing" signs. Ciraolo had
erected two fences around his property, and the inner one was ten feet high. Riley was growing
his plants inside a greenhouse whose contents were obscured from ground-level view by trees,
shrubs, and his mobile home. The complex photographed in the Dow Chemical case was a 2000
acre facility guarded by "elaborate security" measures, presumably for the purpose of protecting
the company's trade secrets. Each of these unusual, though hardly unique, precautions against
public exposure is relevant to the assessment of empirical risk because it likely will be effective in
reducing that risk. Though they do not directly establish that the Court's empirical assessments
are incorrect, at minimum the existence of these privacy-preserving measures supports the
conclusion that the subjective expectations of privacy entertained by the defendants in these
cases were empirically more reasonable than they would have been had the precautionary
measures not been taken.
111. Compare Melvin Gutterman, A Formulation of the Value and Means Models of the
Fourth Amendment in the Age of Technologically Enhanced Surveillance, 39 Syracuse L. Rev. 647,
666-75 (1988); Serr, 73 Minn. L. Rev. at 625 (cited in note 92).
112. But not necessarily its exclusive focus. See note 68.
113. "The ultimate question, plainly, is a value judgment. It is whether, if the particular
form of surveillance practiced by the police is permitted to go unregulated by constitutional
restraints, the amount of privacy and freedom remaining to citizens would be diminished to a
compass inconsistent with the aims of a free and open society. That, in outright terms, is the
judgment lurking underneath the Supreme Court's decision in Katz, and it seems to me the
judgment that the fourth amendment inexorably requires the Court to make." Amsterdam, 58
Minn. L. Rev. at 403 (cited in note 50). See also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoted in note 58); LaFave, 28 Ariz. L. Rev. at 299 (cited in note 66).
114. To reiterate the distinction, the empirical reasonableness assessment should measure
whether there is in fact a significant risk that a private matter will be exposed to the view of
others in the ordinary course of events. That is distinct from the question of normative reason-
ableness-whether a given expectation of privacy is one that should be afforded constitutional
protection.
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reasonableness analyses is that they are driven, covertly, by
unarticulated conclusions regarding normative reasonableness.'15
Pluralist values are negatively affected when, as appears to be
the case here, the doctrinal appeal to subjective experience functions
as little more than an empty rhetorical device that serves as a vehicle
for suppressed normative judgments. A more candid consideration of
the Fourth Amendment values that produce a "free and open
society"16 could have two salutary effects. First, it would relieve
pressure on the empirical reasonableness analysis that determines
when the individual can be said to have exposed, or risked exposing,
otherwise private matters; perhaps absent existing normative
motivations, more plausible empirical conclusions would be reached.
In addition, suppressing normative debate concerning any substantive
constitutional norm is inherently anti-pluralist; it impedes
consideration of diverse values and experiences that might inform the
normative constitutional judgment." 7
It appears, then, that in pluralist terms the doctrinal appeal to
subjective experience is a failure in the existing Fourth Amendment
expectation of privacy cases. These results, however, at least in part,
may be the consequence of the relatively weak connection between the
doctrinal goals at stake in these cases and pluralist values in gen-
eral.118 Further consideration of the lessons of the Fourth Amendment
decisions will therefore be deferred pending evaluation of the Estab-
lishment Clause and "dissent" cases.
B. The Establishment Clause: Messages of Endorsement
The standard generally used by the Supreme Court for resolu-
tion of Establishment Clause cases was first set forth in Lemon. v.
Kurtzman."19 The Lemon test has three prongs: "First, the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or pri-
mary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion . . .; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive
115. Compare Cunningham, 73 Iowa L. Rev. at 579-80 (discussing Miller), 581-82 (discussing
Smith) (cited in note 77).
116. Amsterdam, 58 Minn. L. Rev. at 403 (cited in note 50). See note 113.
117. See text accompanying notes 27-31.
118. See text accompanying notes 50-51.
119. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). For a helpful overview of the Religion Clauses, see generally
Douglas Laycock, A Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States, 47 Ohio St. L. J. 409 (1986).
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government entanglement with religion."'120 The Lemon rule has been
the object of a great deal of academic and judicial discussion, much of
it critical, 121 but it remains the dominant doctrinal vehicle for analysis
of Establishment Clause claims.
In 1984 Justice O'Connor articulated a proposed "clarification"
of the Lemon rule. In Lynch. v. Donnelly,2 2 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the question whether a municipal Christmas display that
included a nativity scene or creche was permissible under the Estab-
lishment Clause. The Court majority upheld the constitutionality of
the challenged display, following the general contours of the Lemon
analysis. Justice O'Connor concurred in the opinion of the Court, but
also wrote separately to propose a "refinement" of the Lemon test. In
her view, it would be helpful to interpret the first two prongs 23 of the
Lemon rule to emphasize the messages sent by challenged govern-
ment activity, by inquiring whether the latter operates as governmen-
tal endorsement or disapproval of religion.124  Accordingly, the
120. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (citation omitted) (quoting WaL v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,
674 (1970)).
121. See, for example, Leonard W. Levy, The Establishment Clause: Religion and the First
Amendment 128 (Macmillan, 1986) (noting that "[s]ometimes the Justices make distinctions that
would glaze the minds of medieval scholastics"); Phillip B. Kurland, The Religion Clauses and the
Burger Court, 34 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1984) (characterizing his description of the cases as
"sound[ing] like it derived from Alice's Adventures in Wonderland"); Laycock, 47 Ohio St. L. J. at
450 (cited in note 119) (claiming that "the three-part test has been so elastic in its application that
it means everything and nothing"); John H. Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amend-
ment and the Philosophy of the Constitution, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 847, 848 (1984) (arguing that "by re-
peating these slogans we come no closer to understanding what is really at stake"); Mark
Tushnet, Reflections on the Role of Purpose in the Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses, 27 Win.
& Mary L. Rev. 997, 997 (1986) (revealing that "virtually everyone who has thought about the re-
ligion clauses ... finds the Supreme Court's treatment of religion clause issues unsatisfactory").
122, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
123. Justice O'Connor's approach retains the "entanglement" prong of the Lemon test. See
the passage quoted in note 126.
124. Commentary on Justice O'Connor's proposal has been extensive. Among the admirers
are Donald L. Beschle, The Conservative as Liberal: The Religion Clauses, Liberal Neutrality,
and the Approach of Justice O'Connor, 62 Notre Dame L. Rev. 151 (1987); Kenneth L. Karst, The
First Amendment, the Politics of Religion and the Symbols of Government, 27 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L.
Rev. 503 (1992); Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards Religion Under
the Establishment Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice O'Connor's Insight, 64 N.C. L. Rev.
1049 (1986); William P. Marshall, "We Know It When We See It": The Supreme Court and
Establishment, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 495 (1986); Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal
Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 592, 610-11 (1985); W. Scott Simpson, Comment,
Lemon Reconstituted: Justice O'Connor's Proposed Modifications of the Lemon Test for
Establishment Clause Violations, 1986 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 465.
Commentators largely critical of the "messages of endorsement" proposal include Steven D.
Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No En-
dorsement" Test, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 266 (1987); Note, Developments in the Law: Religion and the
State, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1606, 1647-50 (1987); James M. Lewis and Michael L. Vild, Note, A
Controversial Twist of Lemon: The Endorsement Test as the New Establishment Standard, 65
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"purpose" prong should be understood to ask "whether government's
actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion"; the "effects"
prong asks "whether, irrespective of government's actual purpose, the
practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or
disapproval." 125
The "effects" prong of Justice O'Connor's "endorsement" test
should be understood to implicate the subjective experience of those
who observe challenged government activity. Interpreted in light of
O'Connor's rationale for her "endorsement" proposal--concern over the
harms to outsiders occasioned by government messages regarding
religion-the most plausible reading of her distinction between the
message government means to send and the message "in fact
convey[ed]" is that the latter reflects the actual experience of the
observers. 126 In the context of the Lynch facts, therefore, the "effects"
Notre Dame L. Rev. 671 (1990); Michael M. Maddigan, Comment, The Establishment Clause, Civil
Religion, and the Public Church, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 293,300-01,330-34 (1993).
125. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
126. Id. Justice O'Connor described the underlying rationale for her "messages of
endorsement" approach as follows:
The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adherence to a relig-
ion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community. Government
can run afoul of that prohibition in two principal ways. One is excessive entanglement
with religious institutions .... The second and more direct infringement is government
endorsement or disapproval of religion. Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents
that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompany-
ing message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political com-
munity. Disapproval sends the opposite message.
Id. at 687.88.
The view that the "effects" prong of O'Connor's endorsement test is an appeal to subjectivity
is shared by several commentators. Steven Smith, for example, says: "In Lynch, [O'Connor]
implied that the relevant perceptions would be those of real human beings-the actual flesh-and-
blood citizens of Pawtucket, or perhaps of the nation as a whole." Smith, 86 Mich. L. Rev. at 291
(cited in note 124). However, it's also possible to read O'Connor as having proposed only a
"reasonable person" test. See, for example, Karst, 27 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 514 (cited in note
124) (stating that "the relevant inquiries are whether government action is undertaken with the
purpose to endorse religion, or is reasonably perceived as endorsing religion"). This
interpretation receives some support from the fact that in one passage of her Lynch opinion,
Justice O'Connor describes the distinction between the "purpose" and "effects" prongs of her
proposed test as resting on the difference between the "intention of the speaker and the 'objective'
meaning of the statement in the community." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
To the extent that she's suggesting that a statement has only a single meaning in the community,
this language is consistent with the "reasonable person" interpretation of the "effects" prong. On
the other hand, this is the same passage that Smith characterizes as implying that "the relevant
perceptions would be those of real human beings," and Martha Minow has described O'Connor's
use of "objective" here as "unfortunate." Minow, 101 Harv. L. Rev. at 47 (cited in note 23). In
addition, even Karst, who is the commentator most clearly adhering to the "reasonable person"
interpretation, acknowledges that O'Connor's "objective observer" construct-apparently roughly
equivalent, in Karst's view, to the "reasonable observer'-is not consistent with her underlying
"harms to outsiders" rationale. Karst, 27 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 516 (cited in note 124)
(stating, "It extracts the endorsement inquiry from real people's sense that government is labeling
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question was whether the inclusion of a creche in the city's Christmas
display in fact communicated to those who saw it a message of
municipal endorsement of Christianity. The obvious problem is that a
range of messages likely will be actually conveyed by the display. 27
Justice O'Connor's discussion of the message sent by the Lynch
display is worth quoting at length:
Pawtucket's display of its creche, I believe, does not communicate a mes-
sage that the government intends to endorse the Christian beliefs represented
by the creche. Although the religious and indeed sectarian significance of the
creche, as the District Court found, is not neutralized by the setting, the
overall holiday setting changes what viewers may fairly understand to be the
purpose of the display-as a typical museum setting, though not neutralizing
the religious content of a religious painting, negates any message of endorse-
ment of that content. The display celebrates a public holiday, and no one con-
tends that declaration of that holiday is understood to be an endorsement of
religion. The holiday itself has very strong secular components and tradi-
tions. Government celebration of the holiday, which is extremely common,
generally is not understood to endorse the religious content of the holiday,
just as government celebration of Thanksgiving is not so understood. The
creche is a traditional symbol of the holiday that is very commonly displayed
along with purely secular symbols, as it was in Pawtucket.
These features combine to make the government's display of the creche
in this particular physical setting no more an endorsement [than other, per-
missible] governmental "acknowledgements" of religion .... The display of
the creche likewise serves a secular purpose--celebration of a public holiday
with traditional symbols. It cannot fairly be understood to convey a message
of government endorsement of religion.
128
This passage illustrates three possible strategies for resolving
the question of what message was in fact sent by the creche display:
reliance on the Justice's own perceptions ("I believe"), unsubstantiated
generalization ("generally is not understood"), and the imposition of
explicitly normative constraints on the range of acceptable subjective
experience ("cannot fairly be understood"). The first of these strate-
gies, privileging one's own experience and perspective, is inconsistent
with a central norm of judicial decisionmaking, and accordingly is not
an approach that is openly acknowledged. The second potential
them as outsiders-the very concern that Justice O'Connor properly saw as the main justification
for the endorsement test."). Therefore, I proceed on the assumption that, properly read in
context, O'Connor's "effects" prong constitutes an appeal to subjectivity.
127. Several commentators have recognized this as a central problem for the "messages of
endorsement" test. See, for example, Karst, 27 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 515-16 (cited in note
124); Marshall, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 533-34, 536-37 (cited in note 124); Smith, 86 Mich. L. Rev. at
291-95 (cited in note 124); Tribe, 98 Harv. L. Rev. at 611 (cited in note 124); Note, 100 Harv. L.
Rev. at 1648 (cited in note 124); Lewis and Vild, Note, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 688-90 (cited in
note 124).
128. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692-93 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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avenue of resolution has an empirical cast, as it appears to rely on
what is "generally" the case, but Justice O'Connor disavowed this
method a bit further on in her Lynch opinion:
[W]hether a government activity communicates endorsement of religion is not
a question of simple historical fact. Although evidentiary submissions may
help answer it, the question is, like the question whether racial or sex-based
classifications communicate an invidious message, in large part a legal
question to be answered on the basis of judicial interpretation of social
facts.129
This leaves a central role for the third strategy, the reinterpretation of
subjective experience through a normative lens.13 0  Represented in
Lynch by the concept of what the observer might "fairly" understand
to be the message sent by the creche display, this third approach
became prominent in Justice O'Connor's subsequent "messages of
endorsement" opinions.
The concept of the "objective observer" became the principal
vehicle for the elaboration of Justice O'Connor's normative strategy in
the cases that followed Lynch. In Wallace v. Jaffree,13 Justice
O'Connor explained that in assessing the effects of a challenged mo-
ment of silence statute, "[t]he relevant issue is whether an objective
observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implemen-
tation of the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement of
prayer in public schools."132 In addition, she said:
In assessing the effect of such a statute-that is, in determining whether the
statute conveys the message of endorsement of religion or a particular re-
ligious belief--courts should assume that the "objective observer" is ac-
quainted with the Free Exercise Clause and the values it promotes. Thus in-
dividual perceptions, or resentment that a religious observer is exempted
from a particular government requirement, would be entitled to little weight
if the Free Exercise Clause strongly supported the exemption.
133
129. Id. at 693-94.
130. The "objectification" of subjective experience described here is somewhat different from
the requirement that subjective experience be exhibited in an objectively identifiable manner, dis-
cussed earlier in connection with the Fourth Amendment subjective expectation of privacy cases.
Justice O'Connor appears to want to narrow the range of experiences that "count" even more than
would be accomplished by application of the "exhibited" requirement; not all of the experiences
manifested in an appropriate manner will be credited under her proposal. See note 186 and
accompanying text.
131. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
132. Id. at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
133. Id. at 83 (citation omitted) (discussing the need to reconcile the commands of the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses).
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In Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.134 the Court considered an
Establishment Clause challenge to a Connecticut statute that re-
quired private businesses to permit employees not to work on their
chosen Sabbath. O'Connor concurred in the Court's opinion holding
the challenged law unconstitutional, and again wrote separately as
well:
In my view, the Connecticut Sabbath law has an impermissible effect because
it conveys a message of endorsement of the Sabbath observance .... There
can be little doubt that an objective observer or the public at large would-
perceive this statutory scheme precisely as the Court does today. The
message conveyed is one of endorsement of a particular religious belief, to the
detriment of those who do not share it.
135
O'Connor's "objective observer" analysis became more explicitly
normative in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos. 136 She concurred in the
Court's judgment that the exemption for religious organizations from
the employment discrimination provisions of Title VII is constitu-
tional, at least as applied to nonprofit activities. Justice O'Connor
reasoned that:
Because there is a probability that a nonprofit activity of a religious or-
ganization will itself be involved in the organization's religious mission, in my
view the objective observer should perceive the government action as an ac-
commodation of the exercise of religion rather than as a Government en-
dorsement of religion. 1
37
More recently, the "objective observer" has been displaced by
explicit discussion of the normative contours of "endorsement." In
134. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
135. Id. at 711 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
In two additional cases decided during the 1984 Term, Justice O'Connor downplayed the role
of the "objective observer." In Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), she agreed
with the Court majority that a "Community Education" program funded with public monies was
constitutionally impermissible; the majority had relied in part on the reasoning that the program
had the effect of creating a "symbolic union of government and religion," although the opinion did
not mention the "objective observer." Id. at 389-92; see id. at 398-400 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
However, Justice O'Connor disagreed with the majority with respect to the same district's
"Shared Time" program for the reasons stated in her dissenting opinion in Aguilar v. Felton, 473
U.S. 402 (1985). In Aguilar, she asserted that l[iln light of the ample record [of professionalism or
the religious differences between teachers and students], an objective observer of the
implementation of the Title I program in New York City would hardly view it as endorsing the
tenets of the participating parochial schools." Id. at 425 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). O'Connor's
Aguilar opinion did not address the concept of "symbolic union" advanced by the majority in
Grand Rapids.
136. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
137. Id. at 349 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pitts-
burgh Chapter,13 Justice O'Connor concluded that although the case
involved the display of a creche on public property, the facts were
distinguishable from the facts of Lynch. She concluded that the Al-
legheny County Christmas display did indeed send a "message of en-
dorsement":
I agree that the creche displayed on the Grand Staircase of the Allegheny
County Courthouse, the seat of county government, conveys a message to
nonadherents of Christianity that they are not full members of the political
community.... In contrast to the creche in Lynch, which was displayed in a
private park in the city's commercial district as part of a broader display of
traditional secular symbols of the holiday season, this creche stands alone in
the county courthouse. The display of religious symbols in public areas of
core government buildings runs a special risk of "mak[ing] religion relevant,
in reality or public perception, to status in the political community." . . .The
Court correctly concludes that placement of the central religious symbol of the
Christmas holiday season at the Allegheny County Courthouse has the un-
constitutional effect of conveying a government endorsement of Christian-
ity.139
Similarly, the "objective observer" played no role in Board of
Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens.140 Writing for a
plurality, Justice O'Connor responded in three ways to the argument
that permitting a student religious group to use school facilities after
hours would convey a message of endorsement of religion. She argued
that "secondary school students are . . . likely to understand that a
school does not endorse or support student speech that it merely
permits on a nondiscriminatory basis;"141 that "there is little if any risk
of official state endorsement or coercion where no formal classroom
activities are involved and no school officials actively participate;"'4
and that "[tio the extent that a religious club is merely one of many
different student-initiated voluntary clubs, students should perceive
no message of government endorsement of religion."'4 It's especially
remarkable that Justice O'Connor omitted reference to the perceptions
of the "objective observer" because the petitioners in Mergens had
argued that "an objective observer in the position of a secondary
138. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
139. Id. at 626-27 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Justice O'Connor's discus-
sion of the second issue in the case, the display of a menorah alongside a Christmas tree, was
similar in style; the "objective observer" again was absent from the analysis. See id. at 632-37.
140. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
141. Id. at 250 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
142. Id. at 251.
143. Id. at 252.
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school student will perceive official school support for [the] religious
meetings."144
The need for some account of the way one decides what mes-
sage is actually conveyed by a government activity has been apparent
from the beginning of this line of cases. In Lynch, for example, Justice
Brennan drew a conclusion about the message sent by the challenged
display that was the direct opposite of that reached by Justice
O'Connor:
The "primary effect" of including a nativity scene in the city's display is,
as the District Court found, to place the government's imprimatur of approval
on the particular religious beliefs exemplified by the creche. Those who be-
lieve in the message of the nativity receive the unique and exclusive benefit of
public recognition and approval of their views. For many, the city's decision
to include the creche as part of its extensive and costly efforts to celebrate
Christmas can only mean that the prestige of the government has been con-
ferred on the beliefs associated with the creche, thereby providing "a signifi-
cant symbolic benefit to religion...." The effect on minority religious groups,
as well as on those who may reject all religion, is to convey the message that
their views are not similarly worthy of public recognition nor entitled to
public support.
145
Justice Brennan's interpretation of the message conveyed by the
Pawtucket nativity display underscores the obvious fact that any
government activity will send different messages to different observ-
ers. Thus, to become a plausible approach, the "effects" prong of
Justice O'Connor's "messages of endorsement" test must provide some
means of identifying the subjective experiences that will be credited,
and those that will not.
Justice O'Connor, however, has failed to provide even a start-
ing point for such an analysis. She offers no discussion of the criteria
that make the "objective observer" "objective"; the content of the
"objective observer's" perceptions are not to be discovered by any
empirical method of examining the cultural context in which a
challenged government action has taken place; and Justice O'Connor
provides no guidelines for determining the "social facts" that comprise
the subject of "judicial interpretation."146 O'Connor does tell us that
the "objective observer" is "acquainted with the text, legislative
history, and implementation" of the statutes challenged under the
Establishment Clause, but those characteristics are more relevant to
144. Id. at 249.
145. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 701 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.,
459 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1982)).
146. See text accompanying note 129.
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the "purpose" prong of her test than to resolving the question of whose
experiences "count."147 Accepting Justice O'Connor's distinction
between the two prongs of her "messages of endorsement" test at face
value leads to the conclusion that the "objective observer" has a decid-
edly weak connection to any lived experience. In the most recent case,
Mergens, Justice O'Connor appears to have abandoned the "objective
observer" altogether, without providing any substitute.
Perhaps one should infer that, as in the subjective expectation
of privacy cases, there is some suppressed reading of the substantive
constitutional provision at issue driving O'Connor's understanding of
the content of the "objective observer's" perceptions. 14 The difficulty
with this interpretation, however, is that it is wholly inconsistent with
the underlying rationale of her "messages of endorsement" approach.
The "purpose" and "effects" prongs of Justice O'Connor's
Establishment Clause test have no referents other than the messages
sent by government activity. In regard to the "effects" prong in
particular, there is ostensibly no component of the test other than the
message in fact conveyed.149 To hypothesize an independent
interpretation of the Establishment Clause that explains her reading
of the content of the "message conveyed" is to repudiate O'Connor's
fundamental conception of the "messages of endorsement" doctrinal
formulation-that because it sends an impermissible message of
exclusion, government endorsement or disapproval of religion is per se
a constitutional violation.
Another possible explanation for the conclusions reached by
Justice O'Connor concerning messages of endorsement is that the
vacuum created by the absence of explicit normative selection among
competing subjective experiences 1,5 has been filled by her own
147. In addition, we learn that the "objective observer's" perceptions are influenced by his
understanding of the Free Exercise Clause, at least to the extent that he would not perceive as an
endorsement of religion a government activity mandated by the Free Exercise requirement. See
text accompanying note 133.
148. And those of the students whose perceptions were credited, or anticipated, in Mergens.
See text accompanying notes 141, 143.
149. See note 126 for an argument that this is a subjective component.
150. An example of the sort of normative discourse that would be appropriate is provided by
the Harvard Note on Religion and the State; it argues that this problem should be resolved by
privileging the perspective of the "minority or nonadherent." Note, 100 Harv. L. Rev. at 1648
(cited in note 124). This approach converts the doctrinal appeal to subjectivity into a normative
inquiry. For further discussion of this strategy, see text accompanying notes 230-32.
The Court's opinion in Grand Rapids illustrates another normative solution to the problem of
perspective. Justice Brennan selected the perspective of the schoolchildren attending the publicly
supplied classes as the perspective that should "count." See Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball,
473 U.S. 373, 391-92 (1985). However, he provided no explanation of this choice.
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perceptions of the messages implicit in government's actions. Several
commentators have suggested that she appears to impute to the
"objective observer" the perspective that is in fact her own,15' a
conclusion reinforced by her tendency to underscore arguments with
the weight of her own beliefs: "Pawtucket's display of its creche, I
believe, does not communicate a message [of endorsement];" 152 "[i]n my
view, the Connecticut Sabbath law has an impermissible effect
because it conveys a message of endorsement of Sabbath
observance;"'' "in my view, the objective observer should perceive the
Government action as an accommodation of the exercise of religion
rather than as a Government endorsement of religion."1 4
The two explanations may not be wholly distinct. Justice
O'Connor's own perceptions may be influenced by a subliminal un-
derstanding of what symbolic activity the Constitution does and does
not prohibit. If so, the second explanation, like the first, ultimately
hypothesizes that O'Connor's analysis of subjective experience is
affected by the presence of unarticulated constitutional norms. 55 To
this extent, this Establishment Clause doctrine bears some similarity
to the subjective expectation of privacy cases.
The outcomes in both lines of cases are notably assimilationist;
it's obvious that many individuals do not share the perceptions of
Justice O'Connor's "objective observer," just as few would find plausi-
ble the empirical assessments in the expectation of privacy cases.
Pluralism is disserved as well by the imposition of unarticulated
norms; in each context, careful examination of the strategy of
William Marshall has proposed a different approach; he argues that "if the Court can agree
upon the appropriate initial perspective to employ in establishment cases, the range of individual-
ized interpretations will be profoundly limited." See Marshall, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 538 (cited in
note 124). However, the "perspectives" he advocates adopting in three different establishment
contexts are not selected from the subjective experiences of individuals, but represent positions
on the spectrum of normative interpretation of the Establishment Clause itself. See id. at 541
(discussing the "separationist" perspective); id. at 545 (discussing the "accommodationist"
perspective); id. at 548 (discussing "qualified neutrality"). Thus, this proposal falls victim to the
argument advanced in the text accompanying notes 148-49; it repudiates the "message in fact
convey[ed ]" conception of the "effects" test.
151. See, for example, Carl H. Esbeck, The Lemon Test: Should It Be Retained, Reformu-
lated or Rejected?, 4 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 513, 545 (1990); Marshall, 59 S. Cal. L.
Rev. at 536 (cited in note 124); Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 Conn. L. Rev. 701,
711 n.52 (1986). Others have noted more generally that the test provides an avenue for the
introduction of the Justices' perceptions. See, for example, Marshall, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 535
n.235; Smith, 86 Mich. L. Rev. at 292 n.105 (cited in note 124).
152. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
153. Thornton, 472 U.S. at 711 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
154. Amos, 483 U.S. at 349 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
155. This inference is strengthened by the information that the "objective observer's"




doctrinal appeal to subjective experience reveals that it can be
understood as functioning in practice to suppress a normative
constitutional analysis that nevertheless remains operative, and that
may be dispositive of the final outcome of the cases. As discussed
earlier, reaching normative conclusions without explicit consideration
of pluralist concerns is more likely than not to result in anti-pluralist
outcomes.15 Thus, in neither instance does the doctrinal appeal to
subjectivity deliver what it promises--enhancement of pluralism in
law.
The one, perhaps significant, difference between the Fourth
Amendment and Establishment Clause cases is that O'Connor's
"effects" prong is proffered in the context of a constitutional provision
thoroughly infused with pluralist values. Part IV of this Article
contends that the presence, or absence, of larger pluralist objectives
should be an important factor in deciding whether to pursue the
strategy of doctrinal appeals to subjective experience. Before
proceeding to a more complete synthesis of the lessons of the Fourth
Amendment and Establishment Clause cases, however, I will review
some less fully developed appeals to subjectivity.
C. The Rhetorical Use of Subjective Experience in Dissents
This subpart reviews three cases-Bowen v. Gilliard,157 De-
Shaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,1 and
United States v. Kozminski'59-in which individual Justices1 60
apparently appealed to subjective experience in support of positions
they articulated in dissent. Accordingly, none of these cases reflects a
fully developed doctrinal appeal to subjectivity. However, the cases do
exhibit some of the same features seen in the Fourth Amendment and
Establishment Clause contexts, and they will prove useful in Part IV
as examples for the application of the prescriptive guidelines set forth
there.
In Bowen v. Gilliard6l the Court took up a challenge to certain
provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, which Congress had
156. See text accompanying note 117.
157. 483 U.S. 587 (1987).
158. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
159. 487 U.S. 931 (1988).
160. As it happens, each of the dissenting opinions reviewed here was authored by Justice
Brennan. However, he was joined by Justice Marshall in Gilliard and Kozminski, and by Justices
Blackmun and Marshall in DeShaney. They will be referred to collectively as "the dissenters."
161. 483 U.S. 587 (1987).
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enacted to amend the federal Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren (AFDC) program. 162 The statutory change affected the computa-
tion of family income for the purpose of determining the level of
assistance for which a family unit would be eligible. Previously, an
aid recipient could exclude from the family computational unit any
child for whom support payments were being made, regardless of the
amount of support the child received. The amendment required the
inclusion in the filing unit of all children living in the home, but at the
same time allowed the first fifty dollars in child support paid for each
child to be excluded from the total family income. Thus, even if child
support payments for any child exceeded fifty dollars per month, that
income would not have affected the total aid available for the other
children under the former scheme. Under the revised program,
however, the amount of support over fifty dollars would be subtracted
from the AFDC payments, thus lowering the net family income.
The majority relied heavily on precedent in selecting the stan-
dard of review appropriate to the challengers' due process claim; those
precedents dictated deference to Congress's plenary power to define
the scope of entitlement programs.1 63  The Court did address the
challengers' contention that some form of heightened scrutiny would
be appropriate because the statutory provisions at issue interfered
with "a family's fundamental right to live in the type of family unit it
chooses,"'164 taking the view that family interests are implicated only
in the case of "an act whose design and direct effect are to 'intrud[e] on
choices concerning family living arrangements."'165 In contrast, the
Court viewed the Gilliard case as involving a challenge to one provi-
sion of a "complex social welfare system" 166 that only incidentally
impacted the specifics of family living arrangements. The statute
easily passed muster under rationality review.
In dissent, Justice Brennan contended that heightened scru-
tiny was the appropriate standard of review because the government
intrusion into family life effected by the statutory scheme was sub-
stantial. Brennan focused his attention on the relationship between
the child and the noncustodial parent, and in doing so, emphasized the
162. Id. at 589. The challengers also raised a takings claim. Id. at 597.
163. Thomas Ross describes the reliance on precedent in this case as an example of the
rhetoric of "helplessness." See Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our
Helplessness, 79 Geo. L. J. 1499, 1529-30 (1991).
164. Gilliard, 483 U.S. at 601.
165. Id. at 602 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977)).
166. Gilliard, 483 U.S. at 602 (quoting Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 54 n.11 (1977)).
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subjective experience of the child.167 He argued that providing for the
material needs of a child is an important way in which a noncustodial
parent, usually the father, can maintain an ongoing relationship with
his child. 168 The new scheme would limit the amount of support that
could be provided by a parent outside the home for the use of a specific
child, and thus would interfere with that avenue of interconnection.
In addition, Justice Brennan cited evidence suggesting that a
noncustodial father's willingness to visit and maintain a relationship
with his children is intertwined with his ability to provide for their
material support.
69
From the child's perspective, then, the new statutory scheme
had considerable potential to disrupt the child's relationship with a
parent living outside the home. Justice Brennan built his case with
the stories of specific individuals, illustrating the negative effects of
the new scheme on children's lives. In one case, for example, a
noncustodial father who was opposed to his child being on welfare
stopped making child support payments and ceased visiting his child
after the new law took effect. The child's emotional distress was
evident:
Sherrod is very upset that his father no longer visits him. He frequently asks
me why his daddy does not come to see him anymore. Since the time his
father has stopped visitation, Sherrod has begun to wet his bed on a frequent
basis. Also since the visitation stopped, Sherrod has become much more dis-
ruptive, especially in school. Furthermore, his performance in school seems
to have declined.
170
The harm that the Court majority characterized as nothing more than
a financial loss-a reduction in AFDC benefits-thus acquired a very
different meaning when viewed through the lens of the child's experi-
ence of familial relationships.
Justice Brennan afforded somewhat different analytic signifi-
cance to subjective experience in his dissent in DeShaney v. Winne-
bago County Department of Social Services.171 In that case, the Court
considered a Section 1983 claim that Joshua DeShaney had been de-
167. The "subjective" character of Justice Brennan's argument may be highlighted by
comparison with the more traditional approach in Harry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed:
Limits of Private Responsibility and the Public Interest, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 367.
168. Gilliard, 483 U.S. at 615 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 617 (citing a national study analyzing nonfinancial aspects of father-child
relationships after divorce).
170. Id. at 621-22 (quoting Appendix to Jurisdictional Statement at 26a-27a).
171. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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prived of his liberty without due process of law when the state De-
partment of Social Services (DSS) failed to protect him against re-
peated beatings by his father, with whom he lived. The last of these
incidents caused such severe brain damage that Joshua was left
profoundly retarded. The Court held that the Constitution imposes no
duty on the state to protect its citizens against invasions of liberty
committed by private actors.172
Justice Brennan argued in dissent that the majority's distinc-
tion between action and inaction would not hold up under careful
examination, especially in the context of the precedents on which the
majority had relied. 73 However, even assuming that some distinction
between state action and inaction was appropriate, the facts of the
DeShaney case, in Brennan's view, dictated the conclusion that the
state had acted with respect to Joshua. Each person who suspected
that Joshua was being abused relayed his concerns to authorities who
ultimately transmitted the information to DSS, and it was up to DSS
to make the final decision to leave Joshua with his father or to remove
him from that home:
In these circumstances, a private citizen, or even a person working in a
government agency other than DSS, would doubtless feel that her job was
done as soon as she had reported her suspicions of child abuse to DSS.
Through its child-welfare program, in other words, the State of Wisconsin has
relieved ordinary citizens and governmental bodies other than the Depart-
ment of any sense of obligation to do anything more than report their suspi-
cions of child abuse to DSS. If DSS ignores or dismisses these suspicions, no
one will step in to fill the gap. Wisconsin's child protection program thus ef-
fectively confined Joshua DeShaney within the walls of Randy DeShaney's
violent home until such time as DSS took action to remove him.
174
Brennan's argument turns on an empirical claim: given the existence
of DSS, the average person would be inclined to rely on that agency as
the sole means of responding to suspicions concerning child abuse.
172. Id. at 202-03. For thoughtful discussion of this aspect of the case, see Susan Bandes,
The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 Mich L. Rev. 2271 (1990); Jack M. Beerman,
Administrative Failure and Local Democracy: The Politics of DeShaney, 1990 Duke L. J. 1078;
Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family
Violence, 43 Vand. L. Rev. 1665 (1990); Aviam Soifer, Moral Ambition, Formalism, and the "Free
World" of DeShaney, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1513 (1989); David A. Strauss, Due Process,
Government Inaction, and Private Wrongs, 1989 S. Ct. Rev. 53; Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature
of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 5-
14 (1989); Patricia M. Wald, Government Benefits: A New Look at an Old Gifthorse, 65 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 247 (1990).




The problem of subjective experience was presented by the
briefs in United States v. Kozminski,175 but a majority of the Court
opted for a doctrinal standard that obviated any need to take subjec-
tive experience into account. The Kozminskis were dairy farmers who
had, for a period of years, employed two mentally retarded men as
laborers under conditions of such hardship and squalor that federal
authorities ultimately charged them with having violated their
"employees" rights to be free of involuntary servitude .176 Both of the
federal statutes under which the Kozminskis were charged, and even-
tually convicted, were interpreted by the Court to incorporate or track
the Thirteenth Amendment's definition of "involuntary servitude."177
The Court concluded that the relevant statutes prohibit only compul-
sion of services through physical or legal coercion; Justice Brennan
wrote separately to express his disagreement with that position. 178
The government argued in Kozminski that "involuntary servi-
tude" should encompass "the compulsion of services by any means
that, from the victim's point of view, either leaves the victim with no
tolerable alternative but to serve the defendant or deprives the victim
of the power of choice."179  Both the majority and Justice Brennan
viewed this purely subjective approach as unworkable because it
failed to provide adequate notice of what conduct was prohibited. 8°
Justice Brennan went on to propose an "objective" standard that
would avoid the notice problem but would also recognize, and pro-
175. 487 U.S. 931 (1988).
176. For an overview of Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence, see G. Sidney Buchanan, The
Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the Thirteenth Amendment (Houston L. Rev., 1976). Two
recent articles argue for extension of the concept of involuntary servitude. See Akhil Reed Amar
and Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response to DeShaney,
105 Harv. L. Rev. 1359 (1992); Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor. A Thirteenth Amendment
Defense of Abortion, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 480 (1990).
177. The Kozminskis were convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 241 of conspiring to deprive the two
men of their Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from involuntary servitude and of holding
the men to involuntary servitude in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1584. The Supreme Court concluded
that Congress intended "involuntary servitude" to have the same meaning in the Thirteenth
Amendment and § 1584. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 945.
178. The Supreme Court corrected the Sixth Circuit regarding the applicable legal standard,
but the judgment of the lower court was affirmed for other reasons. See id. at 953. Justice
Brennan concurred in the judgment of the Court, but proposed an interpretation of "involuntary
servitude" different from that of either the Sixth Circuit or the Supreme Court majority. Id. at
961-65 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). Because Justice Brennan's opinion concurring
in the judgment of the Court disagrees with, and proposes an alternative to, the Court's view of
the appropriate legal standard, it is treated here as a dissent.
179. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 949; see Brief for the United States at 33, United States v.
Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988) (No. 86-2000) (on file with the Author).
180. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 949; id. at 960-61 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
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scribe, methods of coercion other than physical or legal means. He
concluded that:
Congress clearly intended to encompass coercion of any form that actually
succeeds in reducing the victim to a condition of servitude resembling that in
which the slaves were held before the Civil War. While no one factor is
dispositive, complete domination over all aspects of the victim's life, op-
pressive working and living conditions, and lack of pay or personal freedom
are the hallmarks of that slavelike condition of servitude.
181
The requirement that coercion actually succeed in producing a condi-
tion of servitude need not be applied, Brennan said, in cases of
physical or legal coercion; in such cases concerns about fair notice
already would have been met.18
Justice Brennan's proposed supplement to the Court's rule is
not entirely objective, however. 1'3 The practical success of various
methods of coercion will depend to a considerable extent on the indi-
vidual characteristics of the person to whom they are applied. The
poignancy of the Kozminski case derives in large part from the fact
that the defendants had been taking advantage of the diminished
mental capacities of their two mentally retarded employees; the tech-
niques of coercion actually used in all probability would not have been
effective in coercing persons of average intelligence to remain on the
Kozminskis' farm. Justice Brennan's proposal accommodates actual
experience to the extent that the application of his standard in specific
cases will be determined largely by the subjective experience of the
individuals who are the objects of particular coercive techniques.
These three dissenting opinions present a somewhat different
perspective on the use of subjective experience than do the Fourth
Amendment and Establishment Clause cases. In two of the three
instances, it's unclear whether the dissenters really intend to propose
doctrines that turn on the analysis of subjective experience. In Gil-
liard, Justice Brennan seems to suggest that every interest subjec-
tively experienced as implicating family concerns should be character-
ized as a family interest for constitutional purposes.'84 In another
case, however, Justice Brennan perhaps would find that an interest
experienced as one of "family" should not be so categorized in the
181. Id. at 962-63 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted).
182. Id. at 965.
183. I will argue in Part IV that there is no bright line to be drawn between "subjective" and
"objective" rules. See text accompanying notes 223-24.
184. In two additional cases Justice Brennan has used language suggestive of a pluralist
conception of 'family." See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 508 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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constitutional sense. His position is not fully developed in Gilliard.
Similarly, in DeShaney, Justice Brennan appears to take the view
that state action is present whenever a consensus of appropriately
interested adults considers the state to have acted. Again, it's not
wholly clear whether he would place any limits on this generalization.
However, in at least one important respect, the dissents are
similar to the two doctrines considered earlier. In each instance, the
dissenting opinion fails to provide any explanation of the way it
selects the subjective experience it credits. Not all children experience
the loss of material support as the loss of all emotional ties with a
noncustodial parent; not every concerned adult would interpret the
existence of a Department of Social Services as foreclosing other
avenues of aid for an abused child; and perhaps some mentally re-
tarded adults, as well as persons of average intelligence, would have
found effective ways to resist and escape the Kozminskis' coercive
behavior. In no case does the opinion writer address the reasons for
crediting the subjective experience of some to the exclusion of others'.
In sum, although the cases in which a dissenting opinion
introduces subjective experience present interesting variations on the
problem of doctrinal appeals to subjective experience, they add no
startlingly new insights or perspectives. In these dissents, the use of
subjective experience appears largely result-driven; the dissenters are
no more likely than Court majorities to provide rationales for their
take on the content of subjective experience, and they often are
unclear about the doctrinal significance of the experience-oriented
analyses they undertake. However, these cases will help flesh out the
lessons that may be extracted from the Fourth Amendment and
Establishment Clause cases.
IV. ASSESSING DOCTRINAL APPEALS TO SUBJECTIVITY
A. Preliminary Observations
Several generalizations emerge from this review of the Su-
preme Court's doctrinal encounters with subjective experience. First,
in these constitutional cases, subjective experience is never truly
subjective; the lived experience of real people is always filtered
through one objective lens or another. At a minimum, some objective
manifestation of subjective experience must be present for that expe-
rience to be cognizable by others. Some doctrines incorporate formal
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recognition of this element of objectivity, such as the Fourth Amend-
ment requirement that the individual have "exhibited" a subjective
expectation of privacy, 85 but it necessarily is present whether formally
acknowledged or not. In addition, a somewhat different, more explic-
itly normative sort of objective filter might be imposed on subjective
experience in doctrinal contexts that call for limitations on the range
of subjective experiences that "count."16 Both types of objective fiter
inevitably function as constraints on the degree to which doctrinal
appeals to "subjective experience" can be genuinely subjective.
The second observation that emerges from this examination of
the settings in which subjective experience appears to have been
afforded doctrinal signficance is that the Court has been unable to
provide any credible account of the way it decides which objective
overlay to impose. As noted earlier, the Court's concept of
"reasonable" expectations of privacy is widely viewed as an
indefensible assessment of empirical reasonableness, and the Court
provides little or no explanation of the reasoning behind its
conclusions on that question.18 7 Similarly, it's evident that Justice
O'Connor's "objective observer" has specific subjective experiences that
are not universally shared; to many, the content of those experiences
is improbable in the extreme, but she offers no explanation of the
method by which she selected them.'8
The final generalization arising from the decided cases is that
resolution of the subjective experience problem tends to be driven by
concerns that properly should not influence the analysis at all. Be-
cause the opinions omit any plausible normative or descriptive
analysis of the sort that should be employed to define the objective
contours of subjective experience, the influence of extrinsic normative
or personal considerations appears to be the best explanation for the
Court's conclusions concerning subjective experience. In the
subjective expectation of privacy cases, the outcomes appear to be
driven by unarticulated Fourth Amendment values; the "objective
observer" seems to be defined by Justice O'Connor's own perceptions
of messages of endorsement.189
185. See text accompanying notes 61-63.
186. For example, crediting the experiences of "minorities and nonadherents" represents a
normative selection among appropriately exhibited experiences of endorsement in the Establish-
ment Clause context. See note 150.
187. See notes 92-110 and accompanying text.
188. See text accompanying notes 146-47.
189. However, the outcomes ultimately may have been influenced here, too, by unarticulated
constitutional norms. See text accompanying note 155.
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Taken together, these reflections on the decided cases suggest
that the move to incorporate subjective experience into doctrine serves
only a rhetorical, superficially legitimating function; subjective experi-
ence is not really being taken seriously for its own sake. Justice
O'Connor's proposed Establishment Clause doctrine provides the
clearest illustration of this point. Her proposal is based on her
recognition that one facet of the harm sought to be prevented by that
constitutional provision occurs when religious outsiders receive a
message that they are not full members of the community. However,
that raises a problem of perspective. The Pawtucket creche sent a
"message of endorsement" to some persons who saw it, and sent no
such message to others. But because O'Connor fails to explain why
she credits the experience of the latter, and not the former, the appeal
to subjectivity is empty. What has become of the harm experienced by
the group of viewers who do perceive the creche as a message
endorsing a religion other than their own? The motivating principle
that ostensibly drives O'Connor's doctrinal proposal-concern about
status harms-is negated by the way the proposed rule is applied.
The ultimate inference that perhaps Justice O'Connor credited her
own perception of the creche display only underscores the conclusion
that introducing subjectivity into doctrine does nothing more than
serve as a superficial means of evading serious engagement with the
normative constitutional question at issue.
Pluralism seems to be a two-time loser in these cases. The
Justices' woefully incorrect assessments of the empirical
reasonableness of subjective expectations of privacy in the Fourth
Amendment cases and of the messages actually received in the
religion cases impose obvious and significant costs on the individuals
who would have received constitutional protection from government
intrusion, or from government endorsement of religion, had their
actual subjective experiences been credited in the ways the doctrines
in question suggest. Furthermore, especially in the Fourth
Amendment context, the net result is that the outcomes of the cases
are determined by application of constitutional norms that never are
articulated or openly discussed. 190 The most powerful and coercive of
all norms are those that are viewed as neutral, natural, and
190. In the Establishment Clause cases that turn on the "effects" prong of Justice O'Connor's
test, substantive constitutional norms cannot account for the outcomes unless one abandons the
fundamental justification for that prong-the view that receiving a message of endorsement of re-
ligion constitutes a constitutional violation. See text accompanying notes 148-49.
320 [Vol. 47:273
ALGEBRA OF PLURALISM
inevitable. A regime of unstated, and hence undebated, norms is far
more likely to promote assimilationism than pluralism.
However, it's premature to conclude that the Court's dismal
record in handling the problem of subjective experience is the conse-
quence of some inherent flaw in the strategy of doctrinal appeals to
subjectivity. The difficulty may be attributable more to institutional
concerns than to the nature of subjective experience itself. The follow-
ing section explores the possibility that the Court's doctrinal encoun-
ters with subjective experience have been significantly affected by
discomfort with explicit normative discourse.
B. An Institutional Explanation
The Court's struggles with the problem of subjective experience
may be understood as the consequence of a desire to avoid engaging in
explicitly normative constitutional decisionmaking. A good deal of
modern constitutional discourse is conditioned by what generally is
termed "the counter-majoritarian difficulty."19' The perceived problem
is that judicial review of legislative decisions grants unelected, life-
tenured judges the power to overrule the will of the democratic
majority; absent some "objective"192 strategy of constitutional
interpretation, the invalidation of legislative choices is unjustified,
because it would represent the imposition of personal choices rather
than the implementation of limits on the majority's will as set forth in
the constitutional text itself.193  Preoccupation with the counter-
majoritarian difficulty has spawned a variety of rhetorical moves in
Supreme Court opinions seemingly designed to reclaim the legitimacy
that ostensibly would be lost were judges to acknowledge the
contingency of the substantive choices they make. These strategies
include claims to "strict interpretation" of the constitutional text,
appeals to history, tradition, or consensus, and (often strained)
reliance on precedent.194 In general, today's constitutionalism exhibits
a pronounced reluctance to engage in explicit normative discourse. 95
191. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 16 (Yale U., 2d ed. 1986).
192. In this context, I use "objective" to mean any strategy that appeals to a source
independent of the judge herself.
193. See Stephen L. Carter, Constitutional Adjudication and the Indeterminate Text: A
Preliminary Defense of an Imperfect Muddle, 94 Yale L. J. 821, 823-27 (1985); Gary Peller, Neutral
Principles in the 1950's, 21 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 561, 599-604 (1988).
194. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189, 1244-46 (1987).
195. See Robert M. Cover, Justice Accused (Yale U., 1975); Ross, 79 Geo. L. J. at 1511-13
(cited in note 163) Laurence Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-based Constitutional
Theories, 89 Yale L. J., 1063 (1980).
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This approach to judicial review may account for the Court's
adoption of some of the constitutional doctrines that incorporate
subjective experience. The impulse to turn first to the question
whether an individual lacked the requisite expectation of privacy, for
example, may be explained as a retreat from the relatively less
comfortable alternative of making explicit normative decisions
concerning the privacy interests that should, or should not, be
protected by the Fourth Amendment. Similarly, Justice O'Connor's
proposed Establishment Clause test appears initially to permit the
decisionmaker to avoid declaring what is the "real" message of a
government action; the underlying rationale for her test suggests
recognition of constitutional harm in any message of endorsement
subjectively received.
At the same time, the inclination to avoid explicitly normative
decisionmaking may account for the Court's failure to explain the way
it assesses subjective experience once it has been adopted as an
element of doctrine. Because it's necessary to view subjectivity
through one or more objective lenses, some form of normative
judgment is unavoidable. However, the Court's tendency to evade
overt normative choice militates against resolving the problem of
objective filters on subjective experience in a candid manner.
Accordingly, the opinions are replete with unsupported and conclusory
judgments concerning the content of subjective experience.
These attempts to avoid explicit normative discourse have had
demonstrably adverse effects on the Court's ability to engage in the
rational development of constitutional doctrine. For example, in the
Court's approach to the question of empirical reasonableness in the
Fourth Amendment cases, the normative filter overlaid on subjective
experience seems to derive from the substantive constitutional
guarantee itself. In contrast, an inquiry that focused appropriately on
the first prong of the Katz test would address the circumstances in
which it can be said to be empirically reasonable-or
unreasonable-to assume that an activity intended to be kept from
public view actually will remain so. As the cases reveal, the Court has
been unable to develop a plausible account of empirical
reasonableness and instead appears to have used this issue as a
vehicle for covert resolution of the central constitutional question of
which privacy interests should be brought within the ambit of the
Fourth Amendment's guarantees. Manipulating one normative
inquiry in the service of another clearly is not a desirable mode of
analysis; moreover, the most crucial portion of the constitutional
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analysis never is explicitly addressed, but is wholly resolved sub
silentio.
Overcoming the Court's resistance to explicit normative
discourse might help avoid the principal errors exhibited in the cases
that this Article reviews.'9 A willingness to engage in candid
discussion of constitutional norms could render unnecessary any
appeal to subjective experience in some instances.19 7  Even when
doctrinal resort to subjectivity remains useful, 9198 straightforward
articulation of the objective criteria that determine which subjective
experiences "count" would be helpful and might generate more
plausible outcomes. However, the institutional concerns that
historically have prompted the Court to avoid normative discourse will
not disappear overnight; the temptation to adopt doctrinal appeals to
subjective experience as an evasive strategy is always present.
C. Incorporating Subjective Experience
Because subjective experience is always and inevitably viewed
through some objective filter or lens, the technique under
consideration here carries with it an inherent tendency toward covert
normativity. In combination with the institutional impulse just
described, the strategy of doctrinal appeal to subjectivity appears
fraught with peril, from a pluralist perspective. However, these same
insights provide a basis for formulating guidelines that might mitigate
the anti-pluralist drift of this approach, and thus point in the direction
of its more productive use.
First, the strategy of doctrinal appeal to subjective experience
should be employed only in circumstances in which the potential
benefits outweigh the risks. Because the present concern is with the
pluralist potential of doctrinal appeals to subjectivity, this strategy
would appear to be an option best selected when one's doctrinal
objective is inherently pluralist. When pluralism is not prominently
at stake, resorting to subjective experience offers no clear benefit over
196. See generally Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Belknap Press, 1986); Tribe, 89 Yale L. J.
1063 (cited in note 195).
197. By implication, subjective experience should not be employed as a doctrinal substitute
for explicit debate concerning constitutional norms. As argued previously, the Court's apparent
attempts to appeal to subjective experience as an evasive maneuver have been consistently
unsuccessful, and the suppressed normativity that results is antithetical to genuine cultural
pluralism. The Court's normative interpretation of constitutional provisions should be based on
reasoning openly expressed.
198. As it is, for example, in the cases discussed in Part IV.C.2.
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more explicitly normative approaches, but at the same time raises a
risk of obscuring the normative work that must be done.
In addition, awareness of the risk of covert normativity
counsels a judicious use of doctrinal appeals to subjective experience,
even in those instances in which pluralist values are implicated.
Thus, the second guideline that emerges from examining the decided
cases is that when subjective experience is accorded doctrinal
significance, it should be overlaid with objective filters that are as
normatively open 199 as possible. Each objective filter imposed on
subjective experience carries with it the risk of covert assimilationism;
only a thorough attempt to approximate as nearly as possible the full
range of actual subjective experience can vindicate pluralist values.
Applying these guidelines would alter the doctrinal approaches
in most of the cases under review in this Article. Part IV.C.1 consid-
ers the implications of the first proposed guideline-that doctrinal
appeals to subjective experience should be employed only when the
policy or principle motivating the specific doctrinal provision in
question is inherently pluralist. Part IV.C.2 looks at the application of
the second guideline-that appeals to subjectivity should be
implemented through objective criteria that are as open as possible to
the full range of actual subjective experience. Finally, Part IV.C.3
describes an indirect method of incorporating subjective experience in
constitutional doctrine.
1. Are Pluralist Values at Stake?
On reflection, the Court need not appeal to subjective experi-
ence in DeShaney20° or the Fourth Amendment subjective expectation
of privacy cases because pluralist values are not prominently impli-
cated. In contrast, the Establishment Clause cases provide an
example of an inherently pluralist context in which appeal to
subjectivity might be worthwhile. The two remaining cases,
Gilliard2o and Kozminski,2 2 shed light on the boundaries of this
guideline.
As the proposed guideline suggests, the inquiry regarding
doctrinal appeals to subjectivity begins with the question whether a
given doctrinal provision is designed to implement pluralist values.
199. This term is explained in the text accompanying notes 224-25.
200. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
201. Bowen v. GiUiard, 483 U.S. 387 (1987).
202. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988).
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DeShaney, however, does not directly implicate any substantive
constitutional value. As framed by the Supreme Court, the case
addressed a state action problem: whether the state should be held
liable for the acts of a private individual when the state has done
nothing more than stand by and allow the individual's harmful
conduct to proceed unchecked. Nevertheless, the insight that
doctrinal appeals to subjective experience should be closely linked to
pluralist values sheds some light on the role subjective experience
should play in a doctrinal formulation of Justice Brennan's views on
the case.
Justice Brennan argued that the average citizen or agency
employee who was concerned about Joshua DeShaney would have
relied on the Department of Social Services to investigate claims of
possible abuse and to take appropriate steps to correct the situation.20 3
Given that widespread experience, he contended, the law should deem
the state to have acted with respect to Joshua.2o4 However, Justice
Brennan set forth no general principle that would enable one to
determine whether the state has acted in the relevant sense. The
implicit rule of his DeShaney opinion thus seems to be that, as a
matter of law, the state should be viewed as having acted whenever
the average or reasonable person thinks that it has.
Although Justice Brennan's proposed resolution of the case su-
perficially appeals to subjective experience, it's crucial to note that it
appeals not to the diversity of experience, but to an experience that in
his view is likely to be widely shared. In this sense, the value at stake
is not pluralist in nature; experiences that diverge from those of the
average person need not be credited. Justice Brennan's position in
DeShaney therefore constitutes an objective normative or empirical
claim rather than an example of the appropriate use of subjective
experience in doctrine.05
Similar considerations counsel against the use of a doctrinal
appeal to subjective experience in the Fourth Amendment cases. In
203. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 208 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
204. Id.at210-11.
205. It doesn't follow that a "reasonable person" standard should be employed only in
assimilationist contexts; the pluralist potential of such a standard can be affected by the manner
in which it's implemented. If, as is implicit in DeShaney, a judge must determine what the
"reasonable person" would think or do, as a matter of law, the standard functions as an objective
test. In some instances, however, this sort of standard is treated as a fact question for a jury; in
that case, it operates in a more pluralist manner, at least to the extent that it may take on
different substantive contours in different communities. See Steven D. Smith, Rhetoric and
Rationality in the Law of Negligence, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 277, 294-303 (1984) (explaining that in tort
law, the "reasonable person" standard functions as a device for turning over to juries, as issues of
fact, questions that need not be answered in any uniform way).
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Justice Harlan's original formulation, the Katz test had two prongs:
the requirement that the individual have "exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy," and the question whether the
expectation is "one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable."' 206 These two doctrinal elements intersect in a manner
different than Justice Harlan's formulation suggests. 27 The first
prong necessarily incorporates a requirement that a subjective expec-
tation be manifested in some objectively ascertainable manner.
Justice Harlan's second prong incorporates two distinct notions of
reasonableness, which I've labeled "empirical" and "normative"
reasonableness. However, empirical reasonableness is intimately
bound up with the first prong's requirement that there be an objective
manifestation of subjective expectations of privacy. Properly
understood, the second prong, which represents the core substantive
Fourth Amendment inquiry, asks exclusively whether protection of a
given expectation of privacy is consistent with the values of a "free
and open society."
At a minimum, it can be concluded that the empirical and
normative questions are distinct inquiries that should not be
intertwined. In addition, the second prong of the Katz test leaves no
room for a doctrinal appeal to subjective experience, because that
prong raises a purely normative question that should be concerned
exclusively with the interpretation and application of Fourth
Amendment values. Any potential role for subjective experience,
therefore, must be in connection with the first prong.
The focus of the present inquiry is whether this first prong, if
retained as a separate element of doctrine, should be framed as an
appeal to subjectivity or as an objective, normative inquiry. According
to the proposed guideline, the answer depends on the extent to which
this specific doctrinal provision is designed to embody pluralist values.
On reflection, this element of the Katz test is not inherently pluralist;
rather, like DeShaney, it concerns an empirically or normatively
constructed "reasonable person." Consideration of a classic argument
against retention of the first prong of Justice Harlan's test best makes
the point.20
8
206. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
207. This analysis is set forth more fully in the text accompanying notes 61-68.
208. This argument is set forth in Amsterdam, 58 Minn. L. Rev. at 384 (cited in note 50);
Burkoff, 15 U. Toledo L. Rev. at 527-30 (cited in note 92); LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure § 2.1(c) at
308-09 (cited in note 54).
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The argument that there is no need for any "subjective" doc-
trinal component at all begins with the observation that the existence
of a subjective expectation of privacy is not a sufficient condition for
the conclusion that the privacy interest should receive Fourth
Amendment protection. At the same time, the argument goes, having
a subjective expectation of privacy is not a necessary condition of
Fourth Amendment protection, either. Suppose the government were
to "announc[e] half-hourly on television that.., we were all forthwith
being placed under comprehensive electronic surveillance."209 Surely
that government behavior should not be dispositive of, or even affect,
the normative Fourth Amendment inquiry, no matter how successful
it might be in altering actual privacy expectations. If subjective
expectations of privacy are neither necessary nor sufficient for the
conclusion that a given interest should receive Fourth Amendment
protection, it would seem that subjectivity is, at best, an unnecessary
doctrinal element.2 10
However, even if it's correct that subjective experience, in the
most literal sense, is irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment concept of
"search," it doesn't follow that an explicitly objective analysis of
empirical reasonableness would be equally inapposite. Suppose that
an expectation of privacy is empirically unreasonable not because of a
pattern of government intrusiveness, but because the risk of exposure
to ordinary persons is too great to justify an empirical conclusion that
the matter is likely to remain private in the ordinary course of
events.21 1 One might well argue that whenever an expectation of
privacy is empirically unreasonable for this sort of reason, it is
necessarily an expectation that should not receive Fourth Amendment
protection.212 Accordingly, the empirical reasonableness inquiry could
resolve some cases without resort to the normative question central to
the second prong. Furthermore, because the two inquiries are
analytically distinct, framing them as two separate doctrinal entities
might produce a net gain in clarity.213
209. Amsterdam, 58 Minn. L. Rev. at 384.
210. Examples of the purely normative approach to this Fourth Amendment question can be
found in Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1
(1991); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. Chi. L. Rev. 47 (1974).
211. For example, one cannot have an empirically reasonable expectation of privacy in a
marijuana plant cultivated in the plain view of passers-by.
212. See Serr, 73 Minn. L. Rev. at 627 (cited in note 92).
213. The evil to be avoided is duplication of the existing defect-the intertwining of the
empirical and normative assessments of reasonableness. If one abandoned the first prong of
Justice Harlan's test entirely, the question of empirical reasonableness would be subsumed within
the normative inquiry; the question whether a reasonable person would have expected a
particular item of information to remain private as an empirical matter would be part of asking
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This "defense" of the first prong of the Katz test demonstrates
that its retention would not be justified by a desire to promote plural-
ist values. The object would be to create a category of circumstances
in which the individual reasonably could be said to have exposed, or to
have risked exposing, private matters otherwise enjoying Fourth
Amendment protection. Although the existence of the Fourth
Amendment guarantees themselves might well be a pluralism-
regarding aspect of the Constitution, the enterprise of specifying
conditions under which expectations of privacy would be deemed
empirically unreasonable is not. Indeed, the dominant value here is
predictability: law enforcement officers must be able to identify with
some degree of certainty the circumstances under which Fourth
Amendment guarantees, and their concomitant procedures, do and do
not apply. This constitutional provision is not designed to
accommodate variations in individuals' expectations regarding the
risk of exposure of matters they subjectively wish to keep private.
In contrast, some doctrines and core constitutional values are
intimately connected to cultural pluralism. Unlike the expectation of
privacy cases, Justice O'Connor's Establishment Clause "messages of
endorsement" test exemplifies a question concerning which the case
for doctrinal recourse to subjective experience appears quite
compelling.
Justice O'Connor's point that government may violate the
constitutional prohibition against "establishing" religion through
symbolic as well as substantive means is well taken; government
messages of endorsement or disapproval can significantly affect status
in the community.2 14  Accordingly, the case for recognizing her
"purpose" prong is persuasive: there should be little difficulty in
whether a privacy expectation is one that should be protected in a "free and open society." It is
not obvious that the risk of conflating the two inquiries would be smaller than it is under the
existing approach. On the other hand, the difficulty would not disappear even assuming that the
.subjective" prong of the test, if retained, could be appropriately distinguished from the normative
prong. Because arriving at the conclusion that a given expectation of privacy is empirically
unreasonable would make the normative analysis unnecessary, there would always be an
incentive to explore the empirical question first. The potential to reproduce exactly the current
pattern of allowing covert normative conclusions to drive the empirical analysis is clearly present.
Thus, the choice between the two options is not an easy one to make.
214. The foundation for Justice O'Connor's doctrinal modification of the Lemon test is quoted
in note 126. It is the object of an incisive criticism in Smith, 86 Mich. L. Rev. at 309-13 (cited in
note 124). However, I disagree with Smith's implicit conclusion that there is no place for doc-
trines that attempt to reduce the degree of the alienation he describes as "an inevitable cost of
maintaining government in a pluralistic culture." Id. at 313.
For a defense of the concept of "status harm," see Karst, 27 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 512-30
(cited in note 124).
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finding a constitutional violation when the government intentionally
sends a message endorsing or disapproving a particular religion. The
"effects" prong follows naturally: there should be room for finding a
violation as well when, regardless of the message intended to be sent,
the one subjectively received is one of endorsement or disapproval. 215
The "messages of endorsement" test fleshes out a constitutional
provision intimately connected with pluralist values; identifying
another area of constitutional law as thoroughly and unambiguously
infused with concern for cultural diversity as the First Amendment
would be difficult.216 Indeed, the pluralist thrust of the Establishment
Clause provides the undergirding for the "effects" prong of Justice
O'Connor's test: it makes it plausible to argue that a constitutional
violation should be found whenever the government in fact sends a
message that is perceived to endorse religion. Thus the "effects"
prong, in principle, illustrates a highly appropriate use of the strategy
of doctrinal appeal to subjective experience. It represents a
superficially perfect doctrinal expression of pluralist values.217
The two remaining cases illuminate the boundaries of the first
proposed guideline. Bowen v. Gilliard28 illustrates the difficulty of
deciding whether a doctrinal provision implicates cultural pluralism.
United States v. Kozminski29 demonstrates that pluralist values do
not necessarily exist in isolation.
In Gilliard the Supreme Court concluded that a challenged
alteration in AFDC requirements did not impinge upon constitution-
ally protected family interests. Justice Brennan, in dissent, appeared
to take the position that any government decision that is experienced
as intruding on a family interest should be deemed an intrusion on
family in the constitutional sense, and so should trigger strict scrutiny
of the government action. As previously indicated, it's not absolutely
clear whether Justice Brennan meant to take the position that every
subjective experience of family should constitute a protected interest.
If his true view were that there are limits-that some subjectively
experienced "family" interests are not to be afforded constitutional
protection-under the proposed guideline the preferred approach
would be to engage in normative analysis. Justice Brennan would be
215. The argument that O'Connor's "effects" prong should be read as an appeal to
subjectivity is set forth in note 126.
216. Martha Minow, The Free Exercise of Families, 1991 U. Ill. L. Rev. 925, 936.
217. However, the virtue it possesses in theory is undone by its implementation in the
persona of the "objective observer." See text accompanying notes 223-33.
218. 483 U.S. 587 (1987).
219. 487 U.S. 931 (1988).
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expected to reach, and articulate, an explicitly normative conclusion
concerning the scope of constitutionally protected family interests.2 0
On the other hand, Justice Brennan in fact may have held the view
that every subjective experience of family is constitutionally
significant.221 In this case, the proposed guideline approves a doctrinal
appeal to subjective experience as a means of protecting the widest
possible range of diverse family interests.
The descriptive question whether Justice Brennan meant to
endorse a limited or an all-inclusive conception of the range of
protected family interests presupposes that there is no consensus on
the degree to which the constitutional "family" value implicates
cultural pluralism as a matter of constitutional interpretation. Were
there such a consensus, as is the case, for example, with respect to the
Establishment Clause, the Constitution itself would dictate the
preferred doctrinal course. However, the role of "traditional family
values"-in other words, the appropriateness of an assimilationist
interpretation of family-is hotly contested in this society.
Consequently, one must first reach a conclusion on the normative
question whether the constitutional value at issue should be given a
pluralist interpretation before applying the first proposed guideline,
which looks to the pluralist content of a specific doctrinal provision.
Like "family," the concept of involuntary servitude at stake in
Kozminski presents a difficult interpretive task along the
assimilationist/pluralist dimension, though with a somewhat different
twist. Separate and competing pluralist and assimilationist values
are present in this context. The notion of involuntariness suggests
there may be a diversity-regarding component of the fundamental
constitutional norm itself: what is prohibited is a condition in which
the individual is held to service against his individual will.222 At the
220. Even under this scenario the role of subjective experience can be significant. It's
relatively easy to take into account the interests and experiences of traditional families, but the
contribution made by the evidence reproduced in Justice Brennan's opinion is that it makes vivid
the perspective of outsiders-here, children whose father lives outside the home and has difficulty
providing for them. Recounting their experience is designed to exert pressure on whatever
unexamined assumptions the Justices may have concerning the nature of the family, and to
prompt the Court to consider expanding the constitutional definition of family to include this sort
of interest. Note, however, that this approach would not constitute the doctrinal appeal to
subjective experience that is the focus of this Article; rather, it's an example of the option
discussed in the text accompanying notes 22-24.
221. An eloquent statement of this position can be found in Minow, 1991 U. Mll. L. Rev. 925
(cited in note 216).
222. This interpretation is consistent with the government's position that a violation could be
predicated in part on a showing that the victim "believed that he was left... with no tolerable al-
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same time, because this constitutional prohibition-and the criminal
statutes that track it-are designed to regulate conduct, arguably
there is a need for greater determinacy as to what is disallowed than
is possible with any standard incorporating subjective experience.
The presence of substantive concerns that pull in a non-pluralist
direction raises the inference that the subjective experience strategy is
not likely to be productive in this setting. However, Justice Brennan's
dissent in Kozminski illustrates an indirect method of accommodating
subjective experience, which will be discussed in Part IV.C.3.
2. Implementing Appeals to Subjectivity
The first generalization drawn from reviewing the decided
cases was that in doctrinal contexts subjective experience is never
absolutely subjective; it is inevitably overlaid with some objective
screen or filtering mechanism. 223 One might argue that this fact alone
means that doctrinal appeals to subjectivity necessarily subvert
pluralism because it demonstrates that to some extent normative
judgment is unavoidable. 224 That would be an overstated conclusion,
however.
The inevitability of objective overlays on subjective experience
does mean that no bright line may be drawn between objective and
subjective doctrinal components. The distinction between objectivity
and subjectivity is more subtle: there is a continuum of objective
filters that might be overlaid on subjective experience, ranging from
relatively porous objective standards that operate to validate most, if
not all, actual subjective experiences, to relatively dense requirements
that function to exclude from further doctrinal consideration some
significant portion of the actual range of lived experiences. Objective
filters that are relatively porous can be described as normatively open,
in the sense that they impose relatively fewer normative requirements
on the subjective experience filtered through them.
It should be apparent that pluralism is served when subjective
experience is viewed through a relatively porous objective filter, and it
is disserved when the objective lens is relatively dense. 225
ternative but to remain in the master's service." Brief for the United States at 33, United States
v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988) (No. 86-2000) (emphasis added) (on file with the Author).
223. See text accompanying notes 185-86.
224. An analogous argument is made in some detail with respect to the law of contracts in
Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 Yale L. J. 997 (1985).
225. Note, however, that objective filters can be evaluated along dimensions other than their
numerical impact. If viewed as an objective filter on subjective experience, a "reasonable person"
standard, for example, may capture the experience of most individuals but nevertheless fail to
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Consequently, whenever a doctrinal appeal to subjective experience is
employed as a means of vindicating pluralist values,26 it should
incorporate the most porous objective filter possible. Justice
O'Connor's "messages of endorsement" test, as she elaborates it,
provides an example of what not to do.
The "effects" prong of Justice O'Connor's test seemingly
requires reference to subjective experience. 227 However, it's evident
that any governmental activity will engender a variety of responses.
Justice O'Connor's proposed solution, the "objective observer"
construct, operates as a relatively dense filter on subjective
experience. 228  Whatever the content of the "objective observer's"
experience, substantial numbers of people will not share the
perspective that is privileged. 229  The "objective observer" thus
eviscerates the test's pluralist potential.
As unsatisfactory as the "objective observer" requirement ap-
pears to be, the problem to which it attempts to respond is not easily
resolved. Every doctrinal appeal to subjectivity must confront the fact
that the range of human experience is virtually infinite. It's likely
that there will always be at least one individual who sees a message of
endorsement of religion in any government activity. Justice
O'Connor's "objective observer" seems intended to reduce to a man-
ageable level the range of subjective experiences that can be credited
for Establishment Clause purposes.
In effect, the "objective observer" functions in the same way as
more explicitly normative limits on the range of subjective experience,
such as the strategy of privileging the experience of "minorities and
nonadherents."230  However, this sort of approach, if dense enough,
converts the appeal to subjectivity into a disguised form of normativ-
vindicate pluralist values, if there are one or more culturally distinct groups that do not share the
norms that make the reasonable person "reasonable." The ultimate assessment that a particular
instance of doctrinal appeal to subjective experience is, or is not, pluralist cannot be reduced to a
simple formula.
226. Most of the analysis in this Article assumes that furthering pluralist values is the only
goal one might appropriately pursue in appealing to subjective experience as an element of
doctrine, but I leave open the (distant) possibility that there may be other legitimate ends as well.
227. The argument that O'Connor might not have intended to propose a subjective test at all
is discussed in note 126.
228. As noted earlier, the "objective observer" appears to be fading from the scene in more
recent cases, but no substitute has yet appeared as a potential solution to the problem of
subjectivity. See text accompanying notes 138-44.
229. The cases in which Justice O'Connor asserts that the "objective observer" "should"
perceive a certain message only exacerbate the density of the objective lens. See, for example,
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327, 349 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
230. Note, 100 Harv. L. Rev. at 1648 (cited in note 124).
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ity that the courts should avoid. 31 The characteristics that define the
range of experiences to be credited are themselves the product of
normative choice; they would more constructively be implemented by
candid discussion of those norms themselves.232 Pluralist goals are not
advanced by resort to subjective experience viewed through dense
objective filters.
Although the "objective observer" overlay is an objective filter
similar in density to the "credit the experience of minorities and
nonadherents" approach, it is even less satisfactory, because there is
no way to discern its implicit normative contours. Thus, the "objective
observer" is a hopelessly ineffective means of implementing pluralist
values. In contrast, the fundamentally pluralist insight that a consti-
tutional harm occurs whenever a message of endorsement is received
might be implemented by a minimal requirement that an individual's
subjective experience-here, an experience of governmental endorse-
ment of religion---be exhibited in some culturally intelligible manner.
This is a porous objective overlay; almost all actual experiences will
pass through it and thus receive recognition in the subsequent consti-
tutional analysis.233
Of course, adopting this approach would require a commitment
to a thoroughly pluralist understanding of the "effects" prong of the
"messages of endorsement" test. Several commentators have argued
that this is not a workable position. 4 My own view is that the test
might nevertheless be acceptable if confined to analysis of purely
symbolic government activity, such as the holiday displays at issue in
231. Furthermore, it may not solve the problem of subjectivity at all; it should be apparent
that "minorities and nonadherents" likely do not share among themselves just one perception of
government messages of endorsement, or of anything else. If what is meant is just a limit on the
range of experiences that "count," the argument in the text still applies-that this is a relatively
dense filter on subjective experience that might be expressed more profitably as simple normative
choice.
232. To illustrate, the decision to credit the experiences of minorities and nonadherents is it.
self a normative choice that should be debated on its own merits. The characteristics of
"minorities and nonadherents" that arguably justify the decision to privilege their perspective can
be expressed straightforwardly as norms governing the constitutional analysis per se.
233. This proposal might be too porous. Suppose, for example, that an individual raised an
Establishment Clause objection to the grizzly bear portrayed on the emblem of the state of
California, on the ground that the grizzly was held sacred by some Native Americans; that person
thus perceived the state emblem to send a message of endorsement of that religion. I believe this
hypothetical could be resolved through an explicit normative account of the concept of "religion,"
but were that not the case, the Court would have to devise some additional objective test that
would effectively exclude that person's experience from the range of experiences that count for
Establishment Clause purposes.
234. See, for example, Smith, 86 Mich. L. Rev. at 291 (cited in note 124) (explaining that "the
result would be government paralysis"); Note, 100 Harv. L. Rev. at 1649 n.39 (cited in note 124)
(claiming "it appears to allow disaffected religious minorities to veto any government action that
they view as imposing religious values on them').
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Lynch and Allegheny County, and the moment of silence laws in
question in Wallace. Even supposing that application of this test
would result in the proscription of all such symbolic activity, one can
plausibly argue that the government interests implicated in those
instances ought to give way to the pluralism embedded in the
Establishment Clause.235
However, setting forth a new doctrinal approach is not the
central goal of this Article. Rather, the proposal is intended to
illustrate the point that some doctrinal incorporation of subjective
experience may be appropriate in some constitutional contexts, and
that the variability of subjective experience is not necessarily disquali-
fying. If there is a constitutional harm to be redressed whenever a
message of endorsement is actually conveyed,236 there must be some
recourse to subjective experience at the level of doctrine, and by
definition, no reason exists to privilege some experience over others.
What is needed, therefore, is a doctrine that as nearly as possible
accepts all subjective experience for what it is.
At the same time, any doctrinal formulation that does credit a
broad range of subjective experiences in the manner just described
has the potential to paralyze government.23 7  Thus, it should be
emphasized that the two guidelines set forth in this Article are
designed to operate in tandem. The impact of a subjective experience
variable is most likely to be judged acceptable when pluralist values
are most directly and least controversially at stake. Accordingly, just
as pluralist objectives militate in favor of imposing only porous
objective filters on subjective experience, the potentially broad reach
of the doctrinal strategy under consideration here counsels that the
strategy be employed only in the context of relatively clear
constitutional commitments to pluralism.
For example, the question whether "family" ought to be given a
pluralist interpretation for purposes of constitutional analysis is much
more controversial than the analogous question regarding "religion."
235. Kenneth Karst makes a similar proposal. Karst, 27 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 505-08
(cited in note 124).
236. One might simply abandon the "effects' prong and find a constitutional violation only in
those instances in which government intends to send a message of endorsement or disapproval.
However, this would not adequately capture the underlying motivation of Justice O'Connor's
'messages of endorsement" approach: the prohibition of symbolic activity that communicates a
stance on religion. For example, the creche displayed alone on the Allegheny County Courthouse
staircase might not have been intended to send a message of endorsement, but there is no doubt
that it did so. The harm is the same, or very nearly so, even in the absence of intent.
237. See sources cited in note 234.
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Consequently, though it would not be difficult to formulate a
constitutional doctrine with respect to family interests that would
conform to the second guideline,23 8 this is not an area in which
satisfaction of the first guideline is a given. 239  Defining family
interests with reference to subjective experience, then, provides an
example of the salutary use of subjectivity only for those who come
down in favor of a thoroughly pluralist interpretation of
constitutionally protected family interests.
2 40
3. An Avenue of Further Exploration
Justice Brennan's proposal in United States v. Kozminski2 41
illustrates another method of solving the dilemma of subjective
experience in a manner consistent with pluralist values. Kozminski
posed the question whether some doctrinal mechanism could be found
that would take account of the mental capacity of the two mentally
retarded adults who were coerced into remaining at work on the
defendants' farm through means that likely would not have been
effective with adults of normal intelligence. The government argued
for a purely subjective test: the victim's belief that there were no
tolerable alternatives should be an adequate predicate for a showing
of involuntary servitude.24 Justice Brennan instead offered what
amounts to a sophisticated "objective manifestation" test: a condition
of involuntary servitude exists whenever certain objective criteria,
such as complete domination over all aspects of the victim's life, are
met.
Justice Brennan's test incorporates the desired accommodation
of the victims' subjective experience because in practice the objective
conditions of involuntary servitude will be more easily reached when
defendants attempt to enslave mentally retarded victims; the same
means are more likely to hold the individual against his will in the
latter cases. At the same time, as Brennan recognizes, the test is best
not characterized as fundamentally subjective, and in that sense is
not an example of the doctrinal strategy that is the principal topic of
238. For example, one might adopt the rule that every family interest, as defined by the
subjective experience of the constitutional challenger, should be afforded constitutional
protection.
239. In contrast. I think it uncontroversial that the Religion Clauses demarcate an area in
which pluralist values are central.
240. As does Martha Minow, for example. See Minow, 1991 U. Mll. L. Rev. 925 (cited in note
216).
241. 487 U.S. 931 (1988).
242. See note 222.
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this Article. 24 On its face, Brennan's approach looks to external,
objective criteria of involuntary servitude, rather than to the
subjective experiences of individuals.
At first glance, Justice Brennan's proposal might seem
vulnerable to the charge of suppressed normativity: as is the case with
other normative lenses, looking to objective manifestations of
subjective experience provides a 'vehicle for the intrusion of
unexamined normative judgments.24 However, I believe this criticism
is not persuasive as applied to Brennan's Kozminski proposal.
First, this is not a case in which the appeal to subjective expe-
rience serves a legitimating function. Because Justice Brennan's
proposed test is explicitly objective, there is no danger that normative
debate will be concealed behind an ostensibly subjective doctrinal
component. Brennan's standard impels explicit normative debate over
the nature of the objective conditions that would constitute
involuntary servitude.
In addition, this is an area in which values of notice and pre-
dictability loom as large as pluralism. At least in its criminal statute
incarnation, the constitutional provision in question prohibits certain
kinds of conduct. It's well settled that another constitutional provi-
sion, the Due Process Clause, requires that a reasonable person be
adequately notified of the proscribed conduct. Resort to a more nearly
"subjective" standard, therefore, would be inappropriate; adequate
notice could not be guaranteed under such a regime.
At the same time, the virtue of Justice Brennan's proposal is
that it accommodates a range-arguably, the full range--of subjective
experience within the confines of a genuinely objective test. The
conditions he sets forth as manifestations of involuntary servitude will
be attained by varying means and degrees of coercion in different
cases, depending to a significant extent on the subjective experience of
the individual victim. Thus, pluralist values-here, the individual's
subjective experience of servitude--can be vindicated in this setting
without resort to the more risky technique of incorporating subjective
experience as an explicit element of doctrine. 245
243. As noted earlier, "objective" and "subjective" are used here as relative terms. See text
accompanying notes 223-25.
244. For a similar argument, see Dalton, 94 Yale L. J. at 1039-66 (cited in note 224).
245. The Brennan strategy does present the risk that the objective conditions of servitude
could be defined in a manner that would credit only a subset of the range of actual experiences of
servitude. However. because normative debate in this case would have to be explicit, the risks
posed by the alternative, which implicate covert normativity, seem even greater.
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The Kozminski dissent illustrates a different sort of doctrinal
recognition of subjective experience. A relatively complex and
explicitly normative "objective manifestation" analysis may be
employed in some circumstances to vindicate the full range of actual
subjective experience. This strategy of implicit appeal to subjectivity
may be especially useful when there is no direct or workable way for
an explicit doctrinal component to aceommodate the range and variety
of actual experience.
V. CONCLUSION
The implications of this review of existing doctrinal appeals to
subjectivity for "outsiders" like Adzan Bedonie and Hodari D. are not
readily captured in a compact concluding statement. Perhaps the
central lesson is that there are no easy answers, no simple formulas
that implement the "rule of law" ideal and at the same time accom-
modate the cultural diversity that these two individuals represent. 24
However, though the Supreme Court has not compiled a particularly
strong record regarding the use of subjective experience as an element
of constitutional doctrine, there may be room for limited optimism.
Focusing more clearly and directly on the objective of accommodating
cultural pluralism might revitalize the technique of employing
doctrinal appeals to subjective experience in constitutional doctrine.
Accordingly, two guidelines that have emerged from this Arti-
cle's review of the existing cases may be useful in rehabilitating the
strategy of doctrinal appeal to subjective experience. First, the
decision whether to appeal to subjective experience in doctrine should
be determined by the pluralist or assimilationist character of the sub-
stantive constitutional or doctrinal provision at stake. Appeal to
subjectivity is unlikely to be a worthwhile doctrinal strategy when
assimilationist values loom large, because in those cases there is rela-
tively little to be gained in pluralist terms, while the strategy of ap-
peal to subjective experience always raises a risk of reintroducing
unarticulated norms. Second, even when subjective experience can
appropriately foster pluralist values, it should be employed in a man-
ner that does not operate as de facto assimilationism; a doctrinal
246. The reader will note that I propose no solution to the specific problems Adzan and
Hodari face. I chose their stories in preference to ones that might be more closely related to the
doctrines under review in this Article as a means of illustrating the proposition stated in the
text-there are no easy answers to the problem of cultural diversity.
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appeal to subjectivity should incorporate an objective filter that is as
normatively open as possible.
These guidelines establish a baseline for future attempts to
incorporate subjective experience as an element of constitutional
doctrine. If followed, they hold out the promise that the strategy of
doctrinal appeal to subjectivity might evolve beyond its present ten-
dency to lapse into covert normativity. The stories of Adzan Bedonie
and Hodari D. impel continued exploration and evaluation of all avail-
able strategies of inclusion.
